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I. INTRODUCTION
Multiyear regulatory commitments, or their absence, are an important
part of the functioning of the telecommunications services and products
industries. Most regulators were probably taught by their parents to
promise only what they intend to do and to do what they promise. Perhaps
these parents did not discuss the economic efficiency of reducing
uncertainty for companies and investors by committing to and complying
with multiyear plans. Regulators are seldom forced to address the
opportunity costs of not making or not complying with multiyear promises
in issuing orders, in discussing their agendas with the industries and
legislators, or in talking with their parents.
Any significant regulatory change requires regulators to weigh a
variety of complex economic and political considerations. While focusing
on multiyear plans for regulatory changes, this Article is not intended to
belittle the difficulty of deciding on and implementing any significant
regulatory change, even on an incremental basis. The point of this Article is
that, under some conditions, it is both possible and beneficial for regulators
to commit to a well-defined, multiyear sequence of regulatory changes. As
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the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (“OECD”)
observed in 1997:
Comprehensive reform is based on a complete and transparent package
of reforms (aimed at a single policy area, sector or multiple sectors)
designed to achieve specific goals on a well-defined timetable.
Comprehensive reform does not mean that all changes occur
immediately; rather, it is consistent with sequencing strategies and
transitional steps as long as they are temporary and steps and timing
are clear. There are several advantages to comprehensive reform:
benefits appear faster (which means that pro-reform interests are
created sooner); affected parties have more warning of the need to
adapt; vested interests have less opportunity to block change; and
1
reform enjoys higher political profile and commitment.

This Article examines several examples of how efforts for
comprehensive reform fared in real multiyear implementations. It also
explores how some piecemeal regulatory changes evolved into efforts for
comprehensive reform based on a well-defined sequence.
Although regulators can sometimes choose between short-term and
long-term approaches, most telecommunications carriers must operate on
the basis of assumptions about long-term industry conditions. Generally,
telecommunications carriers make large investments in long-lived assets
and face long cycles for product/service development and competitive
positioning.
Both regulated and unregulated businesses face uncertainties about
factors such as market demand, technology changes, supply costs, and
competitors’ strategies. For businesses in regulated industries, uncertainty
about future regulations can add to difficulties of companies in attracting
capital and making investments in infrastructure, products, and services.
Business plans are developed with long-term assumptions about a wide
range of factors, some of which are heavily influenced by regulators. While
regulators require or induce carriers to spend billions of dollars annually on
networks and offerings, regulators also often preserve the flexibility of
present and future commissioners to shape future regulations, which will
determine in substantial part the carriers’ returns on these investments. The
business uncertainty for carriers resulting from such regulatory flexibility
can impose costs on carriers in terms of less productive use of resources
and lost opportunities. Costs can be imposed on consumers in terms of
higher prices and lower service quality.

1. Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, The OECD Report on
Regulatory Reform: Synthesis at 25 (1997), at http://www.oecd.org/pdf/M00007000/
M00007872.pdf (last visited Sept. 6, 2002) [hereinafter OECD].
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This Article considers the effects of multiyear regulatory promises
through
analysis
of
several
regulatory
actions
involving
telecommunications carriers in Mexico, Venezuela, Hungary, and the
United States. Regulators have made and kept bold multiyear promises
under some conditions. This analysis considers the conditions leading to
the making of these promises and the decisions to comply with them, often
under market and political conditions substantially different from what was
expected when the promises were made. While multiyear plans may
contain clear adjustment mechanisms for some possible future conditions,
major macroeconomic downturns can swamp some of the rate and service
commitments by both regulators and carriers. This Article also discusses
attempts to make midterm changes to some elements of a multiyear
promise; the balance of various interests through one set of regulations can
be replaced by another plan which rebalances these interests through a
different set of regulations as long as there is a net gain to distribute.
There appear to be substantial efficiency benefits from multiyear
regulatory promises compared to ad hoc, piecemeal, short-term regulatory
decisions whose timing and important details have large uncertainties for
the telecommunications industry. Although conditions may not be
conducive to multiyear promises in some areas, clarity in the standards and
timing for some future regulatory actions can enhance the efficiency gains.
The remaining analysis of this Article is divided into four Sections:
Section II presents the framework for analysis based on several economic
perspectives and an overview of piecemeal regulatory decision making.
Section III discusses examples of multiyear regulatory promises in four
countries. The first part of this Section deals with three examples of the
fairly unusual conditions surrounding the privatization of national
telecommunications carriers; the second part deals with two areas of
sequenced regulatory changes by the United States Federal
Communications Commission (“FCC”). Section IV presents two
conclusions about making and keeping regulatory promises, regarding
procedures and benefits, and analyzes an example of a multiyear promise in
the United States with too much uncertainty about timing, carriers’
obligations, and regulatory standards. Finally, Section V summarizes the
conclusions and recommendations for promoting greater use of multiyear
regulatory plans.

II. FRAMEWORK FOR ANALYSIS
Regulatory decisions develop through a complex evaluation of
various statutory, political, technological, economic, and other
considerations falling within the “public interest.” Legislative directions (or
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their absence) often give regulators substantial discretion to fashion the
scope and timing of their decisions. Many factors drive regulators to adopt
decisions explicitly intended to address only a short time period. These
factors include: obtaining information on and analyzing the market effects
of the short-term rules before implementing rules for later time periods;
testing the political waters before committing to multiyear regulations;
allowing for judicial review before setting long-term expectations;
reflecting the agendas of current commissioners without binding their
successors; and developing a more complete record on options and their
costs and benefits.
On the other hand, some short-term regulatory decisions can be costly
in many ways, including in the productive use of economic resources.
Telecommunications carriers and their suppliers run their businesses based
on multiyear business plans. Predictable future regulations can help them
plan their investments and operations, with benefits to competition,
consumers, and investors.
The following framework for analysis of multiyear regulatory plans
has two parts—an explanation of several economic perspectives, and a
discussion of legal and political considerations in piecemeal regulatory
decisions.

A.

Economic Perspectives

Economists have focused on many principles and tools to improve the
contributions of telecommunications regulations to enhancing consumer
2
welfare and “efficiency.” Economists argue, for example, that the concepts
2. See WILLIAM J. BAUMOL & J. GREGORY SIDAK, TOWARD COMPETITION IN LOCAL
TELEPHONY (1994); EDWIN MANSFIELD, PRINCIPLES OF MICROECONOMICS 240-60 (3rd ed.
1980); BRUCE M. OWEN & STEVEN S. WILDMAN, VIDEO ECONOMICS (1992); J. GREGORY
SIDAK & DANIEL F. SPULBER, DEREGULATORY TAKINGS AND THE REGULATORY CONTRACT
522 (1998); R. H. Coase, The Federal Communications Commission, 2 J.L. & ECON. 1
(1959); Warren G. Lavey, Inconsistencies in Applications of Economics at the Federal
Communications Commission, 45 FED. COMM. L.J. 437 (1993); Warren G. Lavey & Dennis
W. Carlton, Economic Goals and Remedies of the AT&T Modified Final Judgment, 71 GEO.
L.J. 1497 (1983); Gregory L. Rosston & Jeffrey S. Steinberg, Using Market-Based
Spectrum Policy to Promote the Public Interest, 50 FED. COMM. L.J. 87 (1997).
There are a variety of definitions of “efficiency” in the economics and law-and-economics
literatures. See, e.g., RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 4 (2d ed. 1977).
“‘Efficiency’ means exploiting economic resources in such a way that . . . human
satisfaction as measured by aggregate consumer willingness to pay for goods and services []
is maximized.” Id. at 10. 2 THE NEW PALGRAVE DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS AND THE LAW
19-27 (Peter Newman ed. 1998) (defining “efficient norms” and “efficient statute law”);
SIDAK & SPULBER, supra, at 522 (describing allocative, productive, and dynamic efficiency:
“Dynamic efficiency refers to decisions made over time and includes efficiencies in
investment and technological innovation.”). See also ROBERT H. BORK, THE ANTITRUST
PARADOX 91 (1978) (“Productive efficiency refers to the effective use of resources by
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of cross-subsidies and predatory pricing should be based on marginal costs
rather than fully distributed or embedded costs. Spectrum should be
allocated through auctions with flexible uses rather than through
comparative hearings based on vague “public interest” criteria and with
restricted, government-mandated uses. Moreover, maximum rates should
be determined through incentive-based price caps rather than through rateof-return, cost-based regulation. Economists argue that the application of
these and other economic principles have added to the competitiveness,
price decreases, and service improvements of telecommunications markets.
Many economists have addressed the importance of information on
future market conditions in maximizing the efficiency of business
3
operations. In the world of standard economic theory, perfectly
competitive markets occur when all actors have perfect information about
current and future conditions affecting supply and demand, or when
efficient markets exist for dealing with uncertainties, such as insurance or
contingent contracts. The importance of clear information about future
conditions, however, is not a principle that economists have emphasized in
4
their writings on regulation. Moreover, while risk arbitrageurs are active
on some regulatory issues, such as whether a specific proposed merger will
be approved by regulators, there are no organized markets to hedge, insure
against, or trade contingent contracts for most regulatory uncertainties.
The principal concern of this Article is that telecommunications
carriers make less productive decisions on uses of resources because of
uncertainties about future regulation. Professor Michael Porter’s analysis of
competitive strategies for businesses under uncertainty describes the
particular firms. The idea of effective use . . . encompasses much more than mere technical
or plant-level efficiency.” (distinguishing between “productive efficiency” and “allocative
efficiency”)).
Productive efficiency is any activity by a business firm that creates wealth. . . .
Economies of scale, specialization of function, ability to obtain capital,
management skill—all of these and many more are elements that contribute to the
firm’s ability to please consumers, but they are causes rather than manifestations
of efficiency. Efficiency is at bottom a value concept, not a description of
mechanical or engineering operation.
Id. at 104-05.
3. See KENNETH J. ARROW & F.H. HAHN, GENERAL COMPETITIVE ANALYSIS 125-26
(1971); J.P. GOULD & C.E. FERGUSON, MICROECONOMIC THEORY 22, 479-82 (5th ed. 1980);
SIDAK & SPULBER, supra note 2, at 436-38, 462; A. MICHAEL SPENCE, MARKET SIGNALING:
INFORMATION TRANSFER IN HIRING AND RELATED SCREENING PROCESSES (1974); George J.
Stigler, The Economics of Information, 69 J. POL. ECON. 213 (1961); Joseph E. Stiglitz, The
Contributions of the Economics of Information to Twentieth Century Economics, 115 Q.J.
ECON. 1441 (2000).
4. See generally STEPHEN BREYER, REGULATION AND ITS REFORM (1982); STEPHEN J.
BROWN & DAVID S. SIBLEY, THE THEORY OF PUBLIC UTILITY PRICING (1986); ALFRED E.
KAHN, THE ECONOMICS OF REGULATION (1988).
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framework for this concern, without specifically addressing a long-term
approach to regulatory decision making:
Uncertainty is not often addressed very well in competitive strategy
formation . . . . When facing considerable uncertainty, firms tend to
select strategies that preserve flexibility, despite the costs in terms of
required resources or diminished competitive position. . . . Industry
scenarios allow a firm to translate uncertainty into its strategic
implications for a particular industry. . . . The important uncertainties
are those that will influence industry structure, such as technological
breakthroughs, entry of new competitors, and interest rate fluctuations.
External factors such as macroeconomic conditions and government
policy affect competition through, and not independently of, industry
structure. Structural change almost always requires adjustments in
strategy and creates the greatest opportunities for competitors to shift
their relative positions. . . . Early information about the future state of
5
scenario variables has a high strategic value.

Porter’s analysis points to the various types of costs of industry
uncertainty. According to Porter, when facing plausible scenarios with
different strategic implications, companies can: bet on the most probable
scenario; bet on the most advantageous scenario; hedge through a strategy
that produces satisfactory results under all scenarios (usually implying
higher costs or lower revenues than a betting strategy); preserve flexibility
by delaying commitments (often sacrificing first-mover advantages); or use
6
resources to influence the causal factors behind the scenario variables.
Uncertainty about industry conditions has negative implications for
capacity utilization, planning and implementing investments, changing
operations, developing product/service offerings, making procurement
decisions, and other issues in productive use of company resources and
7
competitive positioning.
The business strategy of preserving flexibility by delaying
commitments in the face of regulatory uncertainties is illustrated by the
following recent statement about a large carrier’s delays in deploying
broadband services in the United States:
The biggest thing we’re seeing is that every vendor is asking us every
day what the regulatory environment is going to be so they can start
designing hardware. We can’t go to our board of directors and make
long-term investment decisions when we can’t guarantee that we even
have a chance to recover our cost of capital in the current regulatory

5. MICHAEL E. PORTER, COMPETITIVE ADVANTAGE 446-448, 478 (1985) (emphasis
added).
6. Id. at 473-75.
7. Id. at 476-77.
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environment. And, at the same time, we’re overwhelmed with
8
demands from our consumers to get broadband.

Along the same lines, in 1998, economists Janusz Ordover and Robert
Willig observed: “[f]orced unbundling with its attendant regulatory
uncertainty would likely slow down the investment in the development of
broadband last mile data transport. Investing under the shadow of uncertain
regulatory rules in an innovative service exacerbates the already substantial
9
risks associated with that investment.” Similarly, although many U.S.
10
regulators claim to support faster broadband deployment by carriers,
uncertainty about the details of future regulations can cause carriers and
their suppliers to delay investment and service commitments.
Applying “real option theory” analysis from the corporate-finance
literature, Martin Taschdjian comes to the same conclusion as Porter on the
business strategy of preserving flexibility by delaying long-term investment
11
commitments in the face of regulatory uncertainties. Taschdjian assumes
that, even if policymakers fail to recognize the effects of uncertainty about
regulatory changes, the market does recognize regulatory uncertainty in

8. With Fiber on the Horizon, SBC Seeks New Approach to Policy, TELECOMM. RPT.
Feb. 11, 2002, at W-1, W-3 (interview with Wayne Masters, Senior V.P., Network Svcs.,
SBC Comm., Inc.). See also Internet Freedom and Broadband Deployment Act of 2001:
Hearing on H.R. 1542 Before the House Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 107th Cong. 51
(2001) [hereinafter Internet Hearing] (prepared statement of James H. Henry, Managing
Gen. Partner, Greenfield Hill Capital LLP. “I have had a number of conversations with
institutional investors, including private equity investors, public equity investors, and high
yield investors, that have cited regulatory uncertainty as one of the principal reasons for
avoiding the telecommunications sector in general and [competitive local exchange carriers]
in particular.”); OECD, supra note 1, at 25 (“[P]rivate investors are usually reluctant to
enter the market when reform is unpredictable and there are risks of reversals and delays.”).
9. Joint Application of AT&T Corp. and Tele-communications, Inc. for Transfer of
Control to AT&T Licenses and Authorizations Held by TCI and Its Affiliates or
Subsidiaries, AT&T’s and TCI’s Joint Reply to Comments and Joint Opposition to Petitions
to Deny or to Impose Conditions, CS Docket No. 98-178, app. B, at 20-21 (filed Nov. 13,
1998) (declaration of Janusz Ordover and Robert Willig); see also Warren G. Lavey,
Innovative Telecommunications Services and the Benefit of the Doubt, 27 CAL. W. L. REV.
51 (1990).
10. See Appropriate Framework for Broadband Access to the Internet Over Wireline
Facilities, Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 17 F.C.C.R. 3019, 3066-74 (2002) (separate
statements of Chairman Michael Powell and Commissioners Kathleen Abernathy, Michael
Copps, and Kevin Martin).
11. Martin Taschdjian, From Open Networks to Open Markets: How Public Policy
Affects Infrastructure Investment Decisions, Program on Information Resources Policy,
Harv. Univ. (Nov. 2000) 26-33, available at http://www.pirp.harvard.edu/publications/
#2000 (last visited Sept. 6, 2002) [hereinafter Taschdjian]; see generally RICHARD A.
BREALEY & STEWART C. MYERS, PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE FINANCE 619-39 (6th ed. 2000)
(discussing real option theory, effects of uncertainty on the value of real options, and
analysis of deferring investments).
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determining financial value and making investment decisions. He analyzes
a hypothetical decision on investing in a local telephone network under real
option theory and concludes:
If the public policy goal is to maximize the flow of investment into
new networks and technology, the policy framework suggested by real
option theory is very clear. In order to minimize the policy barriers to
new investment, policymakers need to create a stable regulatory
environment, removing policy as much as possible as a source of
uncertainty. In this context, stability does not mean that policy never
changes. Rather, it implies that the conditions that will cause
intervention are announced in advance, so that investors understand
13
and can consider the policy impacts on their decisions.

Another analytic perspective on multiyear regulatory promises comes
14
from the law-and-economics literature on contracts. Under general
contract law, legally enforceable promises allow one party to induce
actions by the other party that would not be undertaken in response to an
unenforceable statement of intent. Regulators may be able to induce
industry actions which are attractive to the regulators by creating a binding
obligation for future regulators to conform to an announced sequence of
regulatory changes. Such industry actions would not be undertaken at all or
as promptly in the context of piecemeal regulatory decisions or a mere
statement of regulatory goals and agenda. According to this analysis, the
effectiveness of regulatory decision-making suffers in some instances from
the inability of regulators to create commitments which bind their agencies
15
in the future.
Finally, work by Douglass North and others in a field North called the
“new institutional economics” analyzes the way that political and economic
institutions affect the performance of private parties and economies over
16
time. Applying this framework to telecommunications regulatory policies
12. Taschdjian, supra note 11, at 30.
13. Id. at 33.
14. See generally POSNER, supra note 2, at 65-98; Richard A. Posner, Gratuitous
Promises in Economics and Law, 6 J. LEGAL STUD. 411 (1977); Richard Craswell, Two
Economic Theories of Enforcing Promises, in THE THEORY OF CONTRACT LAW: NEW
ESSAYS 19-44 (Peter Benson ed., 2001); Louis Kaplow, An Economic Analysis of Legal
Transitions, 99 HARV. L. REV. 509 (1986); RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, TAKINGS: PRIVATE
PROPERTY AND THE POWER OF EMINENT DOMAIN (1985); Daniel R. Fischel & Alan O. Sykes,
Governmental Liability for Breach of Contract 1 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 313 (1999)
Abraham L. Wickelgren, Damages for Breach of Contract: Should the Government Get
Special Treatment?, 17 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 121 (2001).
15. E.g., William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, The Independent Judiciary in an
Interest-Group Perspective, 18 J.L. & ECON. 875 (1975).
16. DOUGLASS C. NORTH, INSTITUTIONS, INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE AND ECONOMIC
PERFORMANCE (1990); BRIAN LEVY & PABLO T. SPILLER, REGULATIONS, INSTITUTIONS, AND
COMMITMENT: COMPARATIVE STUDIES OF TELECOMMUNICATIONS (1996); Barbara A. Cherry,

LAVEY M AC 15.DOC

10

12/09/02 10:57 AM

FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 55

in five countries, Brian Levy and Pablo Spiller studied how a country’s
political and social institutions shaped the credibility and effectiveness of a
regulatory framework, particularly mechanisms for securing commitments.
Levy and Spiller considered the effects of regulatory governance and a
nation’s other governmental institutions (legislative, executive, and
judicial) on the ability of regulatory incentives to encourage private
investment and support efficiency in the production and use of services.
They concluded:
Performance can be satisfactory under a wide range of regulatory
procedures, so long as three complementary mechanisms are in place
to restrain arbitrary administrative action: substantive restraints on
discretionary actions by the regulator, formal or informal restraints on
changing the regulatory system, and institutions to enforce the
17
restraints.

While Levy and Spiller found that a system granting a high level of
administrative discretion may not be able to generate the expected levels of
investment and welfare, a regulatory regime allowing little flexibility
“though it looks very inefficient, might still provide adequate incentives for
18
investment if it fits the country’s institutional endowment.”
For industries with large investments in long-lived assets and long
cycles for product and service development, regulatory uncertainty or
churn has substantial costs. One type of cost is in terms of business
19
planning and operations. Consumers are harmed because businesses are
The Irony of Telecommunications Deregulation: Assessing the Role Reversal in U.S. and
EU Policy, in THE INTERNET UPHEAVAL: RAISING QUESTIONS, SEEKING ANSWERS IN
COMMUNICATIONS POLICY 355 (Ingo Vogelsang & Benjamin Compaine eds., 2000);
INTERNATIONAL TELECOMMUNICATION UNION, EFFECTIVE REGULATION CASE STUDY: BRAZIL
(2001); Barbara A. Cherry & Steve S. Wildman, Institutional Endowment as Foundation for
Regulatory Performance and Regime Transitions: The Role of the U.S. Constitution in
Telecommunications Regulation in the United States, 23 TELECOMM. POL’Y 607 (1999)
(analyzing constitutional limits on regulatory discretion).
17. LEVY & SPILLER, supra note 16, at 1.
18. Id. at 2.
19. FCC Chairman Michael Powell recently recognized the benefits of reducing
uncertainties in the forms of delays in reaching decisions and judicial reversals (but without
addressing the benefits of providing a multiyear regulatory framework):
[W]e have committed ourselves to driving out uncertainty, by getting out
decisions. There is no greater threat to an entrepreneur, or any business, than
uncertainty. A key government decision that hangs in suspended animation will
kill the best-laid business plan. Competitors are risk takers and are incredibly agile
in their ability to adapt to change, but they must know what to adapt to.
I cannot promise that you will always like our decisions. I cannot make that
promise to any industry, for we are charged with reaching decisions that are
faithful to the statute, and that promote the public interest, not any one private
interest. I can promise, however, that we will strive aggressively to get decisions
out rapidly—decisions that are clear and sufficiently well-reasoned to withstand
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handicapped in raising capital and are reluctant to develop services, add
capacity, or enter new markets under conditions when regulators
substantially change rules several times within a few months or years.
Another type of cost is the limited ability of regulators to cause market
changes through regulatory changes. When regulators make a
determination, compliance requires businesses to make planning and
operations decisions in light of uncertainties about how that ruling will
evolve over many years. As regulators pursue new policies to promote the
public interest, they attempt to steer providers of telecommunications
services and products in different directions. The power of regulators to
effectuate market changes is restricted by their limited influence over
20
buyers from and suppliers to regulated carriers. Moreover, the regulators’
ability to cause these market changes usually is handicapped by their
failure to lay out a predictable multiyear regulatory environment, as well as
their precedent of revising or not enforcing many orders. For example,
regulators are more likely to be frustrated by slow growth of investments
by local telephone competitors when there is an overhang of uncertainty
about interconnection terms and rates. The OECD concluded that “some
reforms are nearly impossible to introduce in gradually without careful and
21
transparent advance planning.”

B.

Piecemeal Regulatory Decisions

Regulators tend to make decisions on rates, services, and other
aspects of a telecommunications market one step at a time, based on the
record that is developed for a single time in a narrowly focused proceeding.
According to the OECD, piecemeal regulatory decisions tend to be
unplanned and tend to address easy reforms first, even if more difficult
22
reforms would have the most benefits.
There is a reluctance to make decisions for steps to be implemented
within one or more years after adoption of the decision. While agencies can
reconsider and reverse their prior orders, decisions with multiyear
implementations limit, at least somewhat, the regulators’ discretion to
judicial scrutiny, for a decision made quickly that is overturned is of no use at all.
We must avoid do-overs.
Michael K. Powell, Chairman, FCC, Remarks at the Ass’n for Local Telecomm. Servs. 2
(Nov. 30, 2001), at http://www.fcc.gov/Speeches/Powell/2001/spmkp111.pdf [hereinafter
Powell].
20. See Michael K. Powell, Remarks at the Goldman Sachs Communacopia XI
Conference at 3-4 (Oct. 2, 2002), at http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs_public/attachmatch/
DOC-226929A1.pdf.
21. OECD, supra note 1, at 25.
22. Id.
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adjust their rules over time according to changing political and market
23
conditions.
Additionally, any steps which are to be implemented in the future are
more likely to be overturned by the courts for lack of a reasoned decision
based on record evidence. Even single-step decisions do not give the
telecommunications service and equipment industries short-term regulatory
certainty because of frequent changes in decisions through reconsideration
of orders by the regulators and/or judicial review, as well as regulatory
discretion in interpreting and enforcing their decisions.
Legislators may encourage regulators to take an incremental
approach. Legislators rely on regulators’ expertise to fill in details in
statutory schemes, address fact-specific issues, and respond promptly to
specific needs. On the other hand, legislators may be opposed to a
commission’s commitment to a well-defined sequence of regulatory
changes or a long-term regulatory plan that may be viewed as invading the
legislators’ domain.
Most decisions by U.S. telecommunications regulators address a
24
fairly narrow range of issues and time periods. While there are often good
reasons underlying the choice of a narrow scope and short-term duration
for a regulatory decision, there may also be substantial costs in terms of the
productive use of economic resources by carriers (such as the ability of
companies to plan and implement their investments, run effective levels of
capacity utilization, and develop and offer new services).
As examples, the FCC has been trying to increase the efficiency of
25
spectrum uses; however, efficiency is sacrificed by its separate auctions of
23. “We have recognized that the Commission is ‘entitled to reconsider and revise its
views as to the public interest and the means to protect that interest,’ so long as it gives a
reasoned explanation for the revision.” MCI WorldCom Network Servs. v. FCC, 274 F.3d
542, 548 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (quoting DirecTV, Inc. v. FCC, 110 F.3d 816, 826 (D.C. Cir.
1997)). See also Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29,
56 (1983) (“While the agency is entitled to change its views on the acceptability of [a prior
policy], it is obligated to explain its reasons for doing so.”) (alteration in original). See
generally United States v. Winstar Corp., 518 U.S. 839 (1996) (finding that the federal
government breached its contractual obligations to certain savings and loan companies
through subsequent legislation where the contractual obligations were formed by regulatory
decisions); Chevron U.S.A. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843-45 (1984)
(stating expert regulatory agency is entitled to deference by reviewing courts).
24. United States telecommunications regulatory decisions are used as illustrations
here. The approach discussed is not confined to any one country or agency.
25. See Michael K. Powell, Chairman, FCC, Remarks at FCC Press Conference 7 (Oct.
23, 2001), at http://fcc.gov/speeches/powell/2001/spmkp109.html (“It is important that the
Commission move from its traditional spectrum management paradigm of ‘command and
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limited blocks of frequencies without a firm, publicly announced schedule
26
for additional spectrum auctions. Efficiency is also forfeited in the FCC’s
decisions to allow more flexible uses of limited blocks of frequencies
27
without addressing future actions for other frequencies. Similarly, the
FCC issues individual orders from time to time requiring
telecommunications carriers to repeatedly modify their networks, so as to
28
29
electronic surveillance,
allow automatic location identification,
30
31
32
collocation, line sharing, number portability, and interconnection with
control’ to a paradigm of market-oriented allocation policy to provide more flexible
allocations that allow multiple uses so that spectrum can be put to its highest and best use.”).
26. See, e.g., Amendment of Part 95 of the Comm’n’s Rules to Provide Reg. Flexibility
in the 218-219 MHz Serv., Report and Order and Memorandum Opinion and Order, 15
F.C.C.R. 1497, para. 18, 17 Comm. Reg. (P & F) 222 (1999) [hereinafter Part 95 Report
and Order].
All auctions applicants participate in the Commission’s auctions process subject to
a developing telecommunications market. . . . [W]e conclude that auction winners
have no expectation that they will be shielded from potential competitors when the
Commission determines that it is in the public interest to allow such potential
competition—either through allocations or expansion of existing services . . . .
Id. See also Amendment of the Comm’n’s Rules to Establish Part 27, the Wireless Comms.
Serv., 12 F.C.C.R. 10785, paras. 4-10, 6 Comm. Reg. (P & F) 771 (1997) (auction of the
frequencies at 2305-2320 and 2345-2360 MHz).
27. See Part 95 Report and Order, supra note 26, para. 18 (“We have repeatedly
allowed for the provision of additional services in existing licensed services after concluding
that it was in the public interest to do so.”); see also Amendment of Part 2 of the Comm’n’s
Rules to Allocate Spectrum Below 3 GHz for Mobile and Fixed Servs. to Support the
Introduction of New Advanced Wireless Servs., including Third Generation Wireless Sys.,
First Report and Order and Memorandum Opinion and Order, 16 F.C.C.R. 17222, para. 1,
24 Comm. Reg. (P & F) 880 (2001):
We recognize that consideration of this band for advanced wireless services has
created uncertainty about the future of the new broadband fixed services being
developed under the current allocation and service rules. Because we believe it is
important to remove this uncertainty, we are now separately addressing and
resolving the allocation issues involving this band . . . .
Id. Protracted litigation over the interplay between the bankruptcy and communications laws
in connection with the FCC’s 1996 auction of certain spectrum licenses for personal
communications service further illustrates the regulatory-related uncertainties facing some
carriers. See, e.g., NextWave Personal Comms. Inc. v. FCC, 254 F.3d 130, 133 (D.C. Cir.
2001), cert. granted, 122 S. Ct. 1202 (2002); see also Requests for Refunds of Down
Payments Made in Auction No. 35, Order, 17 F.C.C.R. 6283 (2002).
28. E.g., Revision of the Comm’n’s Rules to Ensure Compatibility With Enhanced 911
Emerging Calling Sys., Report and Order and Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 11
F.C.C.R. 18676, 3 Comm. Reg. (P & F) 967 (1996) [hereinafter E911 Order]; Dale Hatfield,
A Report on Technical and Operational Issues Impacting the Provision of Wireless
Enhanced 911 Services 6-11 (2002), available at http://gullfoss2.fcc.gov/prod/ecfs/
retrieve.cgi?native_or_pdf=pdf&id_document=6513296239 (hereinafter Hatfield).
29. E.g., The Comms. Assistance for Law Enforcement Act (CALEA), Section 107(c)
Extension of Capability Req., Order, 16 F.C.C.R. 15210 (2001).
30. E.g., Deployment of Wireline Servs. Offering Advanced Telecomms. Capability
and Implementation of the Local Competition Provisions of the Telecomms. Act of 1996,
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33

unbundled network elements. Productive efficiency would rise if carriers
could plan and implement interrelated network upgrades of software
features, hardware configurations, and switching/transmission capacity
reflecting a predictable plan for such regulatory requirements. Another area
of inefficient regulatory signals involves local service competition. The
FCC has repeatedly changed the rules for compensation to competitive and
34
incumbent local exchange carriers
as well as interconnection

Order on Reconsideration and Second Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking in CC
Docket No. 98-147 and Fifth Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking in CC Docket No. 9698, 15 F.C.C.R. 17806, 21 Comm. Reg. (P & F) 1026 (2000).
31. E.g., Deployment of Wireline Servs. Offering Advanced Telecomms. Capability
and Implementation of the Local Competition Provisions of the Telecomms. Act of 1996,
Third Report and Order in CC Docket No. 98-147, 14 F.C.C.R. 20912, 18 Comm. Reg. (P
& F) 758 (1999).
32. E.g., Tel. Number Portability, First Report and Order and Further Notice of
Proposed Rulemaking, 11 F.C.C.R. 8352, 3 Comm. Reg. (P & F) 600 (1996); Tel. Number
Portability, Second Report and Order, 12 F.C.C.R. 12281, 8 Comm. Reg. (P & F) 1377
(1997).
33. See, e.g., Performance Measurements and Standards for Unbundled Network
Elements and Interconnection, Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 16 F.C.C.R. 20641, at
20643-44 (2001) [hereinafter Performance Measurements]:
Implementation of the [Telecommunications Act of 1996] in these numerous
proceedings has yielded benefits to the public in the form of increasing local
competition. The sheer variety and number of regulatory requirements, however,
has also led to concern about how or whether these rules should operate together
at present and in the future. Indeed, at the federal level alone, the Commission’s
obligations to implement and enforce the Act have relied largely on general,
prophylactic regulations, case-by-case adjudication, and, in the context of [§] 271
proceedings, analysis of performance standards on a state-by-state basis. This
regulatory patchwork fails to provide industry with consistent and ‘bright line’
guidance as to whether an incumbent [local exchange carrier] has provided just,
reasonable and nondiscriminatory service in any given situation. This makes it
harder for the industry to comply with the Act and more costly to both the
industry and the Commission to enforce it.
Id. (footnote omitted).
34. See Access Charge Reform, Seventh Report and Order and Further Notice of
Proposed Rulemaking, 16 F.C.C.R. 9923, 23 Comm. Reg. (P & F) 1260 (2001); Developing
a Unified Intercarrier Compensation Regime, Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 16 F.C.C.R.
9610 (2001); Implementation of the Local Competition Provisions in the Telecomms. Act of
1996, Order on Remand and Report and Order, 16 F.C.C.R. 9151, 23 Comm. Reg. (P & F)
678 (2001); Powell, supra note 19, at 4:
The reciprocal compensation issues remained unresolved at the FCC for several
years, having bounced back from court and then remaining unresolved for far too
long. The uncertainty of the outcome was draining the life out of many
[competitive local exchange carriers], as the capital markets assumed the worst
from our impending decision.
Id.
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requirements, making it difficult for all carriers to plan investments and
services.
While far from comprehensive in addressing a relevant business
planning period, even these narrow orders often are far from
straightforward. In many cases, a regulator’s incremental approach
removes only as much uncertainty as the regulator can achieve at that time.
The FCC often receives a wide range of opposing comments which conflict
36
on factual and legal issues. Months or years are spent developing
proposals, findings, statutory interpretations, policy judgments, and rules
while the agency addresses congressional inquiries, concerns, and
legislative proposals, and suffers reversals from court reviews. The FCC
does not fully control its agenda, but must deal with carriers filing sporadic
applications to merge, petitions for waivers of rules, claims for
enforcement actions, or other requests for regulatory action. Months or
years later, the FCC may identify flaws in the rules it adopted from market
experience, by assessing changing market conditions, by developing a new
evaluation of options, or after judicial reversal.
Yet there are some circumstances in which regulators in the United
States and other countries seek to implement a predictable multiyear
regulatory environment in order to expand beyond the efficiencies that
would be gained through step-by-step orders. As discussed below,
establishing multiyear regulatory promises often promotes efficiency even
when the regulator retains the authority to, and does, change the rules
during the applicable term.

III. MULTIYEAR REGULATORY PROMISES MADE AND
ENFORCED (MORE OR LESS)
This Section considers three sets of examples of multiyear regulatory
promises that were made and enforced: (A) privatizing national telephone
companies, including promises as to competition, rates, network expansion,
and service quality standards; (B) restructuring U.S. interstate access
charges and universal service funding; and (C) implementing automatic

35. See Performance Measurements, supra note 33, para. 3; Powell, supra note 19, at 5:
Another critical proceeding in the area of unbundled elements is the Triennial
Review . . . . This proceeding is designed to roll up a number of [unbundled
network elements] issues that have been pressed upon us in piecemeal fashion. A
comprehensive proceeding will allow us to examine the host of UNE related
issues that have been swirling around.
Id.
36. See, e.g., filings in FCC Dkt. No. 01-338, in response to Review of the Section 251
Unbundling Obligations of Incumbent Local Exchange Carriers, Notice of Proposed
Rulemaking, 16 F.C.C.R. 22781 (2001), at http://www.fcc.gov/e-file/ecfs.html.
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location identification capabilities for U.S. wireless services. This analysis
deals with the conditions from which the multiyear promises developed, the
terms of the obligations on both the regulators and the carriers, and the
record of enforcement and compliance.

A.

Privatizing National Telephone Companies

One set of conditions giving rise to multiyear regulatory promises
involves the privatization of national telephone companies through sales of
37
equity interests to strategic buyers. Under these conditions, the buyers are
asked to pay a large up-front purchase price for the equity interest and, as a
result, want to know the multiyear outlook for the company. Regulatory
issues are of great importance in valuing the company, including: what
services it will be allowed to offer, when it will face competition for
various services, what rates it can charge, what service deployment
schedules it must satisfy, and what network and service quality
improvements it must implement. Prospective buyers want certainty as to
these regulatory issues for at least several years, such as a five-year period
for the incumbent national carrier to engage in network expansion, service
quality improvement, and rate restructuring before the incumbent national
carrier faces competition in some services.
Uncertainty lowers the amounts that prospective buyers are willing to
bid, thereby working against the interest of the government in maximizing
the sale price. Also, uncertainty limits the bidders’ willingness to commit to
some proposed restrictions and obligations. Rather than committing to
aggressively investing in network expansion and upgrades, a bidder facing
regulatory uncertainty about rates and competition would likely take a
more hedged approach and attempt to preserve its flexibility to invest only
where the payoff is most attractive. Moreover, there is usually no history of
regulatory decision making or judicial review of regulatory actions in the
country at the time of the privatization, and this increases the bidders’
desire to have the future regulatory conditions spelled out in detail in a
contract enforceable against the government.

37. See generally BEN A. PETRAZZINI, THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF
TELECOMMUNICATIONS REFORM IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES: PRIVATIZATION AND
LIBERALIZATION IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE (1995); William E. Kennard, CONNECTING
THE GLOBE: A REGULATOR’S GUIDE TO BUILDING A GLOBAL INFORMATION COMMUNITY
(1999), available at http://www.fcc.gov/connectglobe/cover.html; Charles Vulylsteke,
Methods and Implementation, in TECHNIQUES OF PRIVATIZATION OF STATE-OWNED
ENTERPRISES, at 8-20 (World Bank, Tech. Paper No. 88, 1988); Bjorn Wellenius et al.,
TELECOMMUNICATIONS: WORLD BANK EXPERIENCE AND STRATEGY 7-10 (World Bank,
Discussion Paper No. 192, 1993); LEVY & SPILLER, supra note 16.
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This Section reviews promises made in the context of privatizing
three national telephone companies, presented in chronological order: (1)
Teléfonos de México, S.A. de C.V. (“Telmex”); (2) Compañía Anónima
Nacional Teléfonos de Venezuela (“CANTV”); and (3) Magyar Távközlési
RT. (“MATAV”). Regulators and carriers agreed to detailed long-term
plans for radically transforming all aspects of the national
telecommunications sector. Aside from showing that detailed, complex
multiyear regulatory promises were made by diverse regulators, these three
examples also reflect diverse experiences in complying with and enforcing
these promises by both regulators and carriers. Although major
macroeconomic downturns swamped some of the rate and service
commitments by both regulators and carriers, some of the experiences
described show that the multiyear plans functioned as part of the ongoing
relations between the carrier and regulator, with room for amendments in
light of market experience and changing conditions. There appear to be
clear efficiency gains from these long-term plans compared to ad hoc,
piecemeal, short-term regulatory decisions that leave carriers and other
interest groups with large uncertainties about future regulatory rules and
actions.

1.

Telmex: Good Guidance from the Plan

In August 1990, the Mexican government amended the license
agreement or concession of the sole provider of landline public
telecommunications services in Mexico in connection with the sale of stock
38
to a strategic investor group. The changes in the concession were in three
main areas, each involving multiyear promises.
First, the agreement established a new method of rate regulation
applicable with some differences in the periods 1991-96, 1997-98, and
39
1999, and thereafter. Through 1990, Telmex had to apply to the Mexican
Ministry of Communications and Transportation (“Ministry”) for any rate
change, with rates established separately for each category of service. The
Ministry applied various analyses and responded to various political
interest groups in deciding whether to allow a particular rate change,
including a policy of keeping local service rates low. The new method in
the concession agreement replaced the ad hoc rate filings and broad
38. The shares sold represented 20.4% of the capital stock and 51% of the voting shares
of Telmex. The investor group, which was viewed as having capabilities to transform the
national carrier, consisted of a group of Mexican investors and subsidiaries of Southwestern
Bell Corp. and France Telecom. TELÉFONOS DE MÉXICO, S.A. DE C.V.: 40 MILLION
AMERICAN DEPOSITARY SHARES, SEC PROSPECTUS 3 (May 13, 1991) [hereinafter TELMEX
PROSPECTUS].
39. Id. at 36.
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Ministry discretion over rates with formulae involving aggregate price caps
and individual service rate flexibility for Telmex. In aggregate, the carrier’s
rates could increase to reflect Mexican national consumer price inflation.
Different productivity adjustments to the national inflation index applied to
40
the aggregate prices in the three different periods. Within the applicable
ceiling on aggregate charges, the method gave Telmex substantial
flexibility to restructure its rates for particular services with the goal of
gradually reducing cross-subsidies (increasing local service rates to cover
costs and decreasing long-distance rates). As long as Telmex complied with
the price cap formulae in the concession agreement, the carrier did not
require the approval of the Ministry to change rates, although the Ministry
41
retained the ability to modify rates when required by the public interest.
Second, the concession agreement established annual standards for
42
line growth, expansion of rural service, and quality of service. Telmex
agreed to: (1) expand the number of lines in service by an average
minimum annual rate of 12% from August 1990 to December 1994; (2)
expand its services to rural areas, in part by providing by December 31,
1994, at least one public telephone or other service in each town with more
than 500 inhabitants; (3) expand the number of public telephones from 0.8
per 1,000 inhabitants in 1990 to 2 per 1,000 inhabitants by the end of 1994,
and 5 per 1,000 inhabitants by the end of 1998; and (4) reduce the
maximum waiting time for installation of telephone service in certain cities
to six months by 1995 and to one month by 2000. The concession also set
forth annual standards for increased service quality.
Third, as long as Telmex complied with the concession, the Ministry
could not license a competing provider of domestic or international long43
distance services or local services to operate before August 1996.
Thereafter, Telmex would be required to allow resale of its services by
other long-distance carriers. The concession further provides that after
December 31, 1996, Telmex would have to interconnect its network with
other licensed carriers and allow customers to choose their long-distance
carrier.
In summary, the Telmex concession contained commitments by the
regulators and carrier extending for at least six years as to performance in
rates, network expansion and service quality, and competition, with many

40. The annual productivity adjustment was 0% for 1991-96, 3% for 1997-98, and to be
determined by the Ministry for 1999 and every four years thereafter to permit Telmex to
earn a rate of return equal to its weighted average cost of capital. Id.
41. Id.
42. Id. at 36-37.
43. Id. at 37.
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standards applicable annually or for other periods. The concession
represented a huge change from the uncharted, ad hoc approach to these
regulatory issues which maximized regulatory discretion. The new
framework, built on multiyear promises, not only increased the value of the
equity sale but also created incentives for investments which were lacking
in the prior approach. For example, Telmex could plan network expansions
with the knowledge that for at least six years it could implement rates
designed to stimulate demand for particular services in particular areas; that
it would not be required by regulators to meet new, unexpected network
and service standards; and that it would not be forced to face competition,
with consequent possible losses of revenues and costs for interconnection.
How did the multiyear promises fare in Mexico? In general, the
regulator and carrier complied with the promises over many years and
varied market conditions. A report at the end of 1996 concluded that “[b]y
44
all accounts, [Telmex] fulfilled [its] part of the bargain.” This report cited
network expenditures of “$12 billion laying more than 18,000 miles of
fiber-optic cable, increasing the number of telephone lines in the country
by 66 percent . . . extended phone service to 25,000 small towns and
boosted the extent of the network’s digitalization . . . from 30 percent to 90
45
percent.” In early 1991 (about nine months after grant of the concessions),
Telmex reported that it budgeted capital expenditures (expressed in
constant pesos) for each of the years 1991-95 that were at least 50% higher
46
than the capital expenditures in 1990. Of the carrier’s total lines in service
47
on December 31, 1996, 35% were restored or replaced since 1991. In
terms of competition, Telmex implemented changes in its network and
systems to allow interconnections with competitors starting on January 1,
1997, and nine competing long-distance carriers were in operation in
48
1997. In 1998, Telmex reported that it had met all of the requirements
established in the concession agreement to be met through the end of 1997,
surpassed many of these standards, and implemented many other operating
49
efficiency and service improvements.

44. John Ward Anderson, Mexico Hangs Up on Long-Running Phone Monopoly;
Laggard Service Primes Market for Major Bidders from Abroad, WASH. POST, Dec. 30,
1996, at A13.
45. Id.
46. TELMEX PROSPECTUS, supra note 38, at 33.
47. TELÉFONOS DE MÉXICO, S.A. de C.V., 1996 SEC FORM 20-F 6 (June 30, 1997)
[hereinafter 1996 TELMEX 20-F].
48. Id. at 11.
49. TELÉFONOS DE MÉXICO, S.A. DE C.V., SEC FORM 20-F 5 (June 30, 1998)
[hereinafter 1997 TELMEX 20-F].
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A deeper look at 1995-97 reveals more about the challenges facing
multiyear regulatory promises typically, and the Telmex concession
specifically. A Mexican economic crisis from about December 1994
through early 1996 affected the rate adjustment mechanism in two ways.
First, Telmex postponed its inflation-based rate adjustments in “voluntary
compliance” with the price stabilization measures implemented by the
Mexican government in December 1994; the measures generally froze
50
prices of public utilities. Beginning on March 1, 1995, and through
monthly rate increases in 1996, Telmex raised its aggregate rates, but by
less than the amount allowed in the concession agreement in light of the
51
52% inflation for 1995. Second, Telmex slowed the elimination of crosssubsidies in its rate structure during 1995. To catch up, throughout 1996-97
Telmex introduced extensive rate increases for local services and
52
redesigned its rate structures for local and long-distance services.
Partly as a result of the effects of this economic crisis on Telmex’s
rates, the transition to competition in 1996-98 may have been rougher than
what the parties anticipated when they entered into the concession
53
agreement in 1990. Among other issues, a major dispute arose over the
fees paid by interconnecting carriers for use of Telmex’s lines to originate
and terminate calls. The concession agreement provided that the terms of
interconnection, including fees, were to be negotiated between the carriers,
54
with the Ministry to impose terms if the carriers were unable to agree.
Because the carriers were unable to agree, the Ministry stepped in amidst
50. Id. at 7.
51. Id. at 7.
52. Id. at 7-8. See also Julia Preston, Mexico’s Telephone Revolution, N.Y. TIMES, Nov.
14, 1996, at D1 (“In the midst of a national economic crisis in 1995, Government regulators
refused to allow big increases in local phone rates. [In 1996], with Telmex forced to prepare
for diminishing long-distance revenue, it felt compelled to jack up local rates rapidly.”);
Barry Geldzahler, Get a Good Partner: Mexican Telecommunications Market, TELEPHONY,
June 24, 1996, at 92. Telmex reported that it eliminated cross-subsidization by the end of
1997. 1997 TELMEX 20-F, supra note 49, at 7.
53. Another dispute arose over Telmex’s resale obligations in the concession
agreement. Through November 1998, the Ministry did not license non-facilities-based
carriers to provide “pure” switched resale services. Telmex did allow licensed facilitiesbased carriers to resell its services. The FCC alleged that the limited scope of resale
authority violated Mexico’s commitment made in the World Trade Organization’s Basic
Telecommunication Services Agreement. Telmex/Sprint Comm., L.L.C., Order,
Authorization and Certification, 12 F.C.C.R. 17551, paras. 20-22, 10 Comm. Reg. (P & F)
549 (1997) [hereinafter Authorization Order]; Telmex/Sprint Comm., L.L.C., Order to
Show Cause, 13 F.C.C.R. 24990, para. 7, 14 Comm. Reg. (P & F) 413 (1998) [hereinafter
Order to Show Cause]. Also, the Ministry released technical rules in 1994 and 1996
addressing various issues in long-distance competition, such as points of interconnection
and customer selection of carriers. 1996 TELMEX 20-F, supra note 47, at 15-16.
54. 1996 TELMEX 20-F, supra note 47, at 15.
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reported threats by Telmex to increase its local rates by as much as 70% if
it did not get the interconnection fees from long-distance services it
55
wanted. In April 1996, the Ministry established the structure for these
fees, including a 58% surcharge on inbound international calls paid to
56
Telmex in 1997-98. This surcharge had the effect of partially protecting
from competitive erosion the remaining cross-subsidies in Telmex’s rates
(below-cost local rates and above-cost long-distance rates).
The Ministry’s surcharge concerned several U.S. inter-exchange
carriers, inciting claims that the Mexican government failed to comply with
its commitment to open its market to competition. This promise was made
in the World Trade Organization’s Basic Telecommunication Services
Agreement, and U.S. concerns led to discussions between the U.S.
57
Commerce Department and the Mexican Ministry in April 1998. The FCC
expressed concern over this surcharge as discriminatory in an October 1997
order and issued a show cause order in November 1998 stating its belief
that this “surcharge discriminates against the new facilities-based
58
international carriers.” The Ministry responded to these pressures by
59
eliminating this surcharge in December 1998.
In review, it appears that the multiyear promises in the concession
agreement established a predictable regulatory framework which fostered
Telmex’s large increase in network investments and improved operations.
Telmex satisfied the targets without having to seek modification of them or
waiver of penalties, in part because of the need to prepare for competition
in long-distance services and the profits associated with expanded and
improved services. The Mexican economic crisis of 1994-96 led to
pressures for Telmex to forgo some rate increases and rate restructuring
allowed under the concession agreement. Despite these changes from what
55. Bloomberg News, Mexico Sets Telmex Fees Before Allowing Competition (Apr. 26,
1996), available at LEXIS, News Library.
56. 1996 TELMEX 20-F, supra note 47, at 16.
57. Bloomberg News, U.S. Backs MCI and AT&T in Mexican Dispute (Apr. 21, 1998),
available at LEXIS, News Library.
58. Authorization Order, supra note 53, paras. 78-81; see also Order to Show Cause,
supra note 53, para. 11.
59. Bloomberg News, Mexican Competitors Receive Interconnect Reprieve (Dec. 2,
1998), available at LEXIS, News Library. See also WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION,
MEXICO—MEASURES AFFECTING TELECOMMUNICATIONS SERVICES; REQUEST FOR THE
ESTABLISHMENT OF A PANEL BY THE UNITED STATES, Feb. 13, 2002, at http://www.wto.org
(request for dispute settlement panel under the World Trade Organization’s General
Agreement on Trade in Services alleging, inter alia, Telmex’s failure to provide
interconnection to U.S. telecommunications carriers at reasonable rates and on reasonable
terms and conditions); David Luhnow, Politics Disrupts Mexico’s Telecom Liberalization,
WALL ST. J., June 4, 2002, at A19 (describing ongoing interconnection, regulatory, and
political disputes in Mexico in 2002 regarding competitive telecommunications services).
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the parties may have expected in 1990 and how Telmex had been preparing
to compete, the Ministry adhered to the dates for competitive entry and
interconnection in the concession agreement. While the concession
agreement left open the level of interconnection charges for competitors,
the pressures by Telmex resulting from its “voluntary” restraints on its rates
most likely led the Ministry to adopt higher interconnection fees through
the 58% surcharge than what it may have expected for a competitive
market. Thus, deviation from one part of the multiyear plan (rates during
and following the economic crisis) had an impact on another part of the
multiyear plan (competitive entry under reasonable interconnection rates).
The multiyear commitments in the concession agreement likely
fostered substantial productive efficiencies for the carrier compared to the
regulatory approach which preceded it. Before the concession agreement,
governmental decisions on the national telephone network were piecemeal,
with large uncertainty about the timing and details of other actions. The
concession agreement stated a unified, long-term framework for the
interrelated aspects of rates, network expansion and upgrades, service
quality and competition. This framework facilitated a large increase in
network expansions and upgrades. There was less business justification for
hedging or preserving flexibility, such as regarding investments in facilities
to support services for which the regulator promised rate increases to be
phased in over several years. With explicit service improvement standards,
the carrier could take an orderly approach to improving its network and
operations. On the other hand, the incomplete aspects of the plan regarding
interconnection charges for competitors (which were not specified by the
regulators until the eve of competitive entry and then sharply revised two
years later) produced uncertainty and some inefficiencies for competitors as
well as Telmex. This uncertainty likely decreased the consumer benefits
from the early years of competition and, thus, from the period covered by
the plan.

2. CANTV: Baseline Plan with Many Deviations and
Renegotiations
Like the Telmex concession, the CANTV concession established a
complex,
detailed,
multifaceted
plan
for
the
Venezuelan
telecommunications sector from 1991 through 2000, in connection with the
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government’s sale of a strategic interest in the national telephone carrier.
The plan included: (1) quarterly adjustments in aggregate rates according to
a price cap related to the rate of inflation in Venezuela; (2) measures to
achieve rate rebalancing gradually, with some flexibility for the carrier in
setting individual service rates; (3) detailed standards for the expansion,
modernization, and improvement of the quality of CANTV’s network and
services; and (4) assurance that CANTV would be the exclusive provider of
local, national, and international switched landline telephone services until
October 2000, except in areas where it failed to meet service require61
ments.
The years after adoption of CANTV’s multiyear promise were filled
with the carrier’s expansion and improvements, but also deviations from,
and substantial amendments to, the requirements. The causes of the
deviations fall into three major categories: The first category of deviations
resulted primarily from factors beyond the control of CANTV or the
Venezuelan Ministry of Transportation and Communications (“Venezuelan
Ministry”). Macroeconomic conditions in Venezuela experienced serious
62
declines from late 1992 through 1996. With the decreased demand for
telephone services, CANTV failed to satisfy certain service expansion
requirements in the concession agreement. The Venezuelan Ministry
agreed to reduced requirements for 1996 through 2000 together with a
commitment to review the expansion standards from 1999 to 2000, to
63
reflect economic conditions as they developed. The carrier cited the
government’s imposition of exchange controls as causing delays in
obtaining equipment and leading to its failure to install required numbers of
64
public telephone lines in 1995. CANTV reported that it remedied the
shortfall in early 1996 and that the Venezuelan Ministry decided to waive
65
any penalties applicable under the concession agreement. Similar to the
Telmex example, high inflation led the Venezuelan Ministry to confine
some aggregate rate increases to levels below those provided for by the
price cap formulae in the concession agreement, and to limit rate increases

60. The interest sold represented operating control and 40% of the equity share capital
of CANTV. The strategic investor group included subsidiaries of GTE Corp., Telefónica
Internacional de España, La Electricidad de Caracas, and AT&T Corp. COMPAÑÍA ANÓNIMA
NACIONAL TELÉFONOS DE VENEZUELA (CANTV), SEC PROSPECTUS at 6-7 (Nov. 21, 1996)
[hereinafter CANTV PROSPECTUS].
61. Id. at 8.
62. Id. at 61.
63. Id. at 61-62.
64. Id. at 17, 63.
65. Id. at 63.
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for basic residential local service. In light of concerns about CANTV
facing competition in 2000, the Venezuelan Ministry and the carrier
entered into a rebalancing agreement in 1996 providing for “catch-up” rate
67
adjustments in the following years.
The second category of deviations from the multiyear plan involved
shortfalls in the carrier’s performance in many categories. Some of these
shortfalls led to remedies provided under the concession agreement, while
others triggered further negotiations between the carrier and the
Venezuelan Ministry. As an exception to the general prohibition on
competition until 2000, the concession agreement allowed the Venezuelan
Ministry to grant other concessions to provide basic local service if
CANTV failed to serve a rural area, or failed to meet its network
expansion, modernization, and service quality requirements in an urban
area for two consecutive years. Starting in 1996, the Venezuelan Ministry
68
exercised this authority to award other concessions in several areas. Also,
CANTV reported repeated shortfalls in its network expansion and service
quality performance, such as timely installation of new lines, repair times,
69
and billing statement improvements. Following CANTV’s request and
several years of negotiation, the Venezuelan Ministry and CANTV in
February 2000 entered into an agreement which superseded the service
70
levels and rate structures in the concession agreement. This agreement
added some requirements based on technologies developed after the 1990
concession agreement; one such requirement was the installation of a new
signaling system for interconnections.
Third, some deviations can be viewed as reluctance from time to time
by the regulator to limit its discretion or abide by some provisions of the
concession agreement when CANTV was in breach of other provisions. For
example, in 1997 the regulator announced that it would not permit CANTV
to receive the full amount of the tariff increases and rate rebalancing
provided by the concession agreement and the rebalancing agreement until

66. Id. at 17, 20, 64.
67. Id. at 66.
68. COMPAÑÍA ANÓNIMA NACIONAL DE TELÉFONOS, 1997 Form 20-F 31 (Apr. 24,
1998).
69. Id. at 26. On the other hand, CANTV reported that it exceeded several
modernization and quality improvement requirements for several years. Id. From 1991 to
1999, customer satisfaction jumped from an average of 47% to 90%, and CANTV nearly
doubled its number of users. Raymond Colitt, CANTV Gets Ready to Line Up Rivals, FIN.
TIMES (London), May 18, 1999, at 30.
70. COMPAÑÍA ANÓNIMA NACIONAL TELÉFONOS DE VENEZUELA, 2000 ANNUAL REPORT
42 (May 25, 2001) [hereinafter 2000 CANTV ANNUAL REPORT].
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the regulators completed a review of the carrier’s costs. According to
CANTV, the concession provided for such a review but did not make the
72
review a condition for implementing the rate changes. Subsequently the
carrier and regulator entered into an agreement allowing the rate changes to
73
go into effect and having the carrier file cost information. Following
further delays in tariff approvals in 1999 and “the commencement of a
preliminary proceeding in contemplation of a legal action by CANTV
against the Government for breach of the Concession,” the carrier and
regulator entered into an agreement in February 2000 which superseded the
74
concession as to rate rebalancing and service level mandates.
Aside from these deviations and amending agreements, the most
important development in the multiyear plan, competitive entry in late
75
2000, went forward largely on schedule. A new telecommunications law
was enacted in June 2000 which, inter alia, sought to establish conditions
76
for fair competition between operators and service providers. In
November 2000, the regulator adopted regulations for new concessions and
77
interconnection requirements applicable to CANTV and other carriers.
Also, in November 2000, the regulator began the auction of frequencies for
wireless local loop services. Six such concessions were granted by early
78
2001 with CANTV not allowed to participate in the auction. Other
technologies were also open to competitors in local and long-distance
79
services, and several competitors were licensed.
Even this development was not as straightforward as contemplated in

71. Raymond Colitt, CANTV Hit by Row Over Rate Rise, FIN. TIMES (London), Mar.
12, 1997, at 28; COMPAÑÍA ANÓNIMA NACIONAL TELÉFONOS DE VENEZUELA, 1997 ANNUAL
REPORT 29 (Apr. 24, 1998) [hereinafter 1997 CANTV ANNUAL REPORT].
72. 1997 CANTV ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 71, at 29.
73. Id.
74. 2000 CANTV ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 70, at 43. The regulator sought
improvements in service quality as a prerequisite for rate increases. Bloomberg News,
Venezuelan Government to Meet CANTV, Discuss New Phone Rates for 1999 (Aug. 23,
1999), available at LEXIS, News Library. In July 1999, CANTV sued the Venezuelan
government; CANTV demanded $8.7 million in damages for the government’s
noncompliance with the terms of the concession. Venezuela’s CANTV Sues Government,
WALL ST. J., July 23, 1999, at A10. In October 1999, CANTV and the government agreed to
appoint a panel of independent telecommunications experts to help resolve the tariff dispute.
Raymond Colitt, Experts to Judge CANTV Dispute, FIN. TIMES (London), Oct. 8, 1999, at
26.
75. 1997 CANTV ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 71, at 20, 31.
76. 2000 CANTV ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 70, at 43.
77. Id. at 44.
78. Id. at 17. See also Reuters, Genesis Wins Two Venezuelan Telecoms Licenses (Dec.
19, 2000), available at LEXIS, News Library.
79. 2000 CANTV ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 70, at 17.
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the concession agreement. In 1997 and 1998, the government took several
actions aimed at authorizing new carriers to build telecommunications
infrastructure prior to November 2000, with competitive services starting at
80
that time. In 1999, CANTV and the regulator negotiated, without
finalizing an agreement, a package of amendments to the concession
involving an early end to CANTV’s monopoly as well as revisions of
81
CANTV’s remaining investment requirements and performance targets.
In 2001, CANTV stated that there could be no assurance that rate
rebalancing to prepare CANTV for competition would ever be completed
82
as contemplated by the concession and the 1996 rebalancing agreement.
What is to be learned from this regulatory promise covering ten
years? As in Mexico, the experience in Venezuela teaches that major
macroeconomic downturns can swamp the rate and service commitments
by both regulators and carriers. An additional lesson from Venezuela goes
to the difficulty in specifying network modernization and service standards
by area over a multiyear period. Such standards are designed to promote
the public interest, by requiring investments to serve areas which would not
be profitably served in an unregulated market and to guide the carrier’s
investment decisions. With uncertainties about demand for services,
upgrading large networks, changing telecommunications technologies and
changing international standards, it is difficult to select reasonable network
modernization and service standards over a long period. Another lesson is
that a multiyear agreement is made in the context of ongoing relations
between the carrier and regulator. The carrier can seek waivers of penalties
and amendments to the agreement, and the regulator can also seek
additional restrictions on rates, new service standards and amendments to
the agreement. The promises of one party do not result in completely
predictable actions for the other party.
Because the national telephone company had been operated as a
branch of the government with no history of regulation of a private
company by an independent regulator, a concession agreement with
multiyear commitments was necessary both to attract a private strategic
investor to CANTV and to satisfy political concerns in Venezuela. Aside
from the threshold conditions which produced the multiyear agreement in
80. Raymond Colitt, Caracas Takes Phone Dispute to Court, FIN. TIMES (London),
May 1, 1998, at 5 (3d ed. London). In 1997, the regulator announced an international tender
for additional operators to compete in basic telephony; and in 1998, he sought a Supreme
Court ruling on the scope of CANTV’s monopoly under its concession agreement.
81. Raymond Colitt, CANTV Wants To End Monopoly, FIN. TIMES (London), May 5,
1999, at 32 (1st ed. London); Raymond Colitt, Experts to Judge CANTV Dispute, FIN. TIMES
(London), Oct. 8, 1999, at 26 (2d ed. U.S.).
82. 2000 CANTV ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 70, at 14.
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Venezuela, the following inquiry is helpful in order to develop general
lessons: With so many deviations and amendments, does hindsight make
the multiyear agreement for CANTV look like it enhanced economic
efficiency in developing the telecommunications sector in Venezuela?
This multiyear promise probably did enhance economic efficiency
compared to piecemeal, ad hoc, short-term regulatory actions addressing
limited changes in the telecommunications sector. At minimum, it
established a time frame for competitive entry with which the regulator
complied; it specified formulae for quarterly rate adjustments with
inflation—this replaced a completely ad hoc process built on government
discretion; and it set forth a process for gradual rate rebalancing toward
cost-based rates. Compared to sporadic, ad hoc decisions to transform the
national telecommunications sector, having a specified ten-year framework
for these major regulatory changes was of likely benefit to CANTV’s
ability to attract capital and planning of its investments, operations, and
service offerings. Even though disputes with the regulator arose as to
implementing the rate changes in some years, the multiyear promise of
inflation-based increases in aggregate rates and rate rebalancing prior to
competitive entry probably facilitated the “catch-up” agreements in 1996
and 2000.
Next, consider the network modernization and service improvement
standards, which were exceeded in some regards and unsatisfied in others.
The multiyear promise probably enhanced efficiency by providing a
baseline for the carrier to plan investments and operational changes, as well
as a framework for discussions between the regulator and the carrier. The
carrier probably recognized, at many times and for many areas, that it
would not satisfy some of the standards. But, as in the case of the shortfall
in public telephone lines in 1995, the multiyear plan allowed the carrier and
regulator to discuss this performance in the context of catching up to the
standard shortly thereafter. In other cases, the multifaceted plan allowed the
carrier to point to standards that it exceeded in order to argue that it should
not be penalized for some shortfalls or that other standards should be
amended. For some standards that were unsatisfied repeatedly, the plan
forced the carrier and the regulator to address the reasonableness of the
standard from the baseline of the mutual prior commitment to that standard.
Perhaps they could agree that, in light of the carrier’s satisfaction of other
standards, changed circumstances, or new evidence on the cost of
compliance, the standard should be modified.
Of course, even if an agreement developed to waive or amend a
standard for the carrier, any such process had costs including negotiating
with the regulator, and perhaps trading off other obligations. Initially
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agreeing to a “better” requirement in the plan would have promoted
efficiency. Yet, there may still be efficiencies from somewhat imperfect
stated standards over a multiyear period as opposed to no agreement.
Silence produces greater uncertainty about what a regulator may require
and when.

3.

MATAV: More Renegotiations and Narrowing of Exclusivity

The MATAV concession in Hungary granted in December 1993 gave
the national telephone company exclusive rights to provide local, domestic
long-distance, and international public telephone services for most of the
83
country through December 2001. As in Mexico and Venezuela, this
concession also established for this period detailed annual standards for
line growth, service quality improvement, network expansion, and network
modernization; a mechanism for adjusting aggregate rates according to
inflation-based price caps; and a process for rate rebalancing.
The regulator agreed in the concession contract that until December
22, 2001, it would use its best efforts to prevent changes in the decrees
relating to interconnection, tariffs, or other telecommunications matters
84
which would have a material adverse effect on MATAV. On the other
hand, in the concession agreement, the Hungarian government retained the
ability to review periodically the provisions of the concession “in the
interest of national defense, public security, consumer interest, economic
85
development and the fulfillment of Hungary’s international agreements.”
Subject to a reconciliation procedure in which the government’s
conclusions must be supported by evidence, the government could
unilaterally modify such provisions in which event MATAV would be
86
entitled to compensation.
Following the fairly lengthy discussions of the multiyear promises in
Mexico and Venezuela, this Author will limit the analysis of the Hungarian
regulatory commitments to two topics: penalties and accelerating
competition.
83. The strategic investors in MATAV at the time of the 1993 concession agreement
were Ameritech and Deutsche Telekom. That agreement covered service in thirty-one local
concession areas as well as domestic long-distance and international services. MATAV
entered into subsequent agreements giving it exclusive rights to provide local public fixedline telephony services through May 2002 in an additional five local concession areas.
Together, MATAV’s local concession areas covered approximately 75% of Hungary’s
population. The remainder was served by other local operators, which interconnected their
networks with MATAV’s networks. MAGYAR TÁVKÖZLÉSI RT.; PROSPECTUS 1 (Nov. 14,
1997) [hereinafter MATAV PROSPECTUS].
84. Id. at 78.
85. Id. at 12.
86. Id.
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Regarding penalties from service-quality and network-improvement
commitments, MATAV increased the number of telephone lines from 1.3
87
million in 1993 to 2.1 million in 1997. MATAV, however, reported that it
paid monetary penalties as provided in the concession agreement for failing
88
to meet certain targets in 1995, 1996, and 1997. MATAV stated that each
year it had agreed with the regulator on the penalties charged for failure to
89
meet quality of service targets. The targets originally established in the
concession agreement were adjusted twice, on a mutually agreed basis, to
achieve what MATAV described as more closely reflecting international
90
and European standards. For failing to connect some subscribers within
the period required by the concession agreement, MATAV had to pay
91
additional liquidated damages in 1998 and 1999. MATAV stated that it
92
did not have to pay any such penalties or liquidated damages in 2000.
It is hard to say whether the penalties specified in the multiyear plan
served their purpose of providing incentives for compliance without
unreasonable costs for failure. Clarity in the standards and penalties in a
plan can reduce disputes and decrease the costs of implementing and
enforcing a plan.
A longer discussion is required to address the developments regarding
the exclusivity granted to MATAV under the concession agreement.
Apparently, the government decided about mid-1997, three and one-half
years into the eight-year exclusivity period, to take steps to increase
93
competition in public telephony services. Among the possible reasons for
this policy: MATAV’s failure to satisfy certain service quality and network
improvement targets; a determination by the Hungarian Competition
Council in February 1997 that MATAV set unreasonably high access fees
for access to its rights-of-way by a cable television company; claims by
telephony operators in areas not served by MATAV that MATAV abused
its dominant position in setting high interconnection charges; Hungary’s
efforts to gain membership in the European Union, which established
87. Anatol Lieven & Anthony Robinson, Making Impressive Progress, FIN. TIMES
(London), Dec. 9, 1997, at 4.
88. The service targets included percentage of call completion, dial-tone delays,
customer service call response times, and number of billing complaints. MATAV
PROSPECTUS, supra note 83, at 79. See also MAGYAR TÁVKÖZLÉSI RT., 1997 FORM 20-F 32
(Apr. 24, 1998) [hereinafter 1997 MATAV 20-F].
89. 1997 MATAV 20-F, supra note 88, at 32.
90. Id.
91. MAGYAR TÁVKÖZLÉSI RT., 2000 FORM 20-F 34 (May 9, 2001) [hereinafter 2000
MATAV 20-F].
92. Id.
93. MATAV PROSPECTUS, supra note 83, at 70; Sheridan Nye, Alliances Set to Clash
Over Hungary (June 9, 1997), at http://www.totaltele.com.
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policies requiring telecommunications competition; and the replacement of
94
the dominant government coalition, starting in July 1998.
The government took several types of action to promote competition
against MATAV before the end of the exclusivity period. In May 1997, the
government announced that it wanted the state-owned broadcaster to
establish a second national telecommunications operator along with the
state rail operator, the national oil company, and a foreign
95
telecommunications operator or consortium. For this joint venture, called
PanTel, the Hungarian government actively sought bids from foreign
telecommunications operators. The new operator was granted two licenses
96
by the regulator in 1999 for voice-over Internet telephony services. These
licenses for telephony, provided via a new technology which was not
available when the MATAV concession was granted, were treated by the
government as outside the scope of MATAV’s exclusivity but clearly
competitive with MATAV’s exclusive services. PanTel targeted business
users, which paid the highest prices relative to the costs of serving them,
while MATAV was gradually rebalancing its rates over the exclusivity
period.
Three other operators were licensed in 1999 and began offering
advanced data services for business users (again treated by the government
as outside the scope of MATAV’s exclusivity on public telephony
97
services), and voice-over Internet telephony services. Early entry into
these services gave these companies an opportunity to expand their
telecommunications networks and customer bases for stronger entry when
subsequently authorized for full-service competition against MATAV.
Additionally, there were reports starting in July 1998, when a new
Hungarian government took office, that the government sought to end
MATAV’s monopoly on long-distance and international calls one year
94. See MATAV PROSPECTUS, supra note 83, at 71-72, 79, 86-87; Lieven & Robinson,
supra note 87, at 4; Bloomberg News, Hungary’s New Government May End MATAV’S
Monopoly Before 2002 (July 10, 1998), available at LEXIS, News Library.
95. Nye, supra note 93.
96. INTERNATIONAL TELECOMMUNICATION UNION, ITU INTERNET REPORTS: IP
TELEPHONY 29 (2000) (Hungarian regulatory agency “was willing also to look for ways of
introducing ‘soft competition’ to Matav ahead of full competition in 2002;” more than 15
companies licensed to provide Internet protocol voice telephony services by December
2000); Setting a Fast Pace for Hungary and Europe, FIN. TIMES (London), Oct. 8, 1999, at
31 (Survey ed. 1); Emma McClune, Profile - Keep an Open Mind In an Open Market,
COMM. WEEK INT’L ONLINE (Feb. 5, 2001), at http://www.totaltele.com; Carolyn Chapman,
Hungary: Eastern Promise, CI-ONLINE, July 1, 2000.
97. See Setting a Fast Pace for Hungary and Europe, supra note 95, at 31; Bloomberg
News, MATAV Faces Competition From Second New Hungarian Phone Company, (Nov.
10, 1998) available at LEXIS, News Library; see also 2000 MATAV 20-F, supra note 91,
at 31; Hungary: Eastern Promise, supra note 96.
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98

early. These reports described talks between the government and
MATAV in 1999 through which the government attempted to obtain
agreement to this change in the concession agreement. No such agreement
to amend was reached, and the government did not use its authority
unilaterally to modify the concession. With the agreed date for ending
MATAV’s exclusivity unchanged, a new telecommunications law
establishing the framework for competition was approved by the Hungarian
Parliament in June 2001. The law became effective in December 2001, and
99
the government passed all necessary decrees to implement it.
The government’s conduct indicates that, but for the 1993 concession
agreement, the government probably would have authorized full
competition for long-distance and international services earlier than
December 2001. Moreover, the government’s actions probably narrowed
the scope of MATAV’s exclusivity to less than what MATAV expected in
1993. For example, MATAV’s initial public offering in November 1997,
more than four years before the end of the exclusivity period, stated in the
first risk factor that the “Hungarian Government is actively seeking to
100
promote competition in the provision of public telephony services.”
Did the multiyear promise in Hungary promote efficiency when,
midway through the term, the most fundamental provision regarding
competitive entry was subject to uncertainties about duration and
government actions to narrow? The analysis considers two perspectives:
that of the carrier, and that of the regulator.
For MATAV, there appear to be efficiency benefits from the
multiyear promise compared to piecemeal, ad hoc regulatory decisions and
the absence of any government commitment on competition. The
exclusivity period was an essential part of a comprehensive regulatory
commitment by the carrier and government. Other related aspects involved:
gradual rate rebalancing to eliminate cross-subsidies that would not be
sustainable under competition and would sharply increase politically
sensitive residential local service charges; expanding services to cover
98. Hungary’s New Government May End MATAV’s Monopoly Before 2002, supra
note 94 (citing Kalman Katona, Minister of Transport, Water, and Telecommunications);
Bloomberg News, MATAV Monopoly May End Earlier Than Planned (Jan. 15, 1999),
available at LEXIS, News Library.
99. Reuters, Hungary Gives Green Light to Deregulation (Dec. 4, 2001), available at
http://www.totaltele.com; 2000 MATAV 20-F, supra note 91, at 6; MAGYAR TÁVKÖZLÉSI
RT., 2001 FORM 20-F 7 (May 9, 2002), available at http://www.matav.hu/english/
world/investors/financial/matav20f2001.pdf. The Act on Communications, inter alia,
introduced a new regime of price controls on retail fixed-line services, imposed a universal
service obligation, and required MATAV to offer unbundled local loops, number portability,
and carrier pre-selection and other interconnection features.
100. MATAV PROSPECTUS, supra note 83, at 11.
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areas that may be unprofitable without cross-subsidies; and meeting targets
for service-quality improvements, as well as network modernization, which
may be inconsistent with the investment priorities of a carrier facing
competition.
The concession provisions likely restrained the scope of competition
that MATAV faced during the exclusivity period, giving it a more stable
regulatory environment in which to plan and implement the other
commitments in the concession agreement. While some of the
government’s actions to promote competition may have surprised
MATAV, the carrier nevertheless did not face full competition until the
date specified eight years earlier in the concession agreement. MATAV’s
investments and business operations were subject to less uncertainty under
the concession agreement, even with the government’s actions, than under
an unmapped regulatory framework. Without the commitments, the
government might have collected information and weighed various factors
(when and according to the regulator’s discretion) in determining whether
to license competitors.
Now consider the regulator’s perspective on this experience. At a
point midway through the exclusivity period, the government determined
that the public interest would be served by accelerating competition.
Suppose that this conclusion was correct in that accelerating competition
would have increased the efficiency of the telecommunications sector. If
the concession agreement restrained implementation of this new policy,
how efficient could the agreement have been?
The concession agreement did not prohibit the realization of
efficiencies from advancing the date for competitive entry. In initially
agreeing to the multiyear, comprehensive, regulatory promise, the regulator
had to weigh any benefits of any date for competitive entry against the
consequences of competition for other regulatory targets and requirements.
The existence of the multiyear promise forced the regulator again to weigh
any benefits from advancing the date for competitive entry against the
comprehensive set of other regulatory targets and requirements set forth in
the plan. In changing policies, the agreement required the regulator to
allocate some benefits to some groups which otherwise would have been
harmed by advancing the date for competitive entry compared to the
101
plan. The amount of such benefits which must be allocated to offset
harms compared to the plan could be less than, equal to, or greater than the
benefits from the policy change. As long as the political and private
transaction costs are not so large as to make any change unreasonable,

101. See Kaplow, supra note 14, at 576-81.
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requiring a reallocation of benefits is not contrary to the public interest and
allows for new efficiencies to emerge.
Beginning in 1993, the regulator required the privatized MATAV to
satisfy certain service and network targets, and abide by certain rate
regulations through 2001. Each year of the market conditions associated
with exclusivity provided part of the compensation to MATAV’s strategic
investors and other shareholders for accepting these requirements. In
addition to the interests of MATAV’s shareholders, these market
conditions also formed the basis for the regulator to get the benefits from
cross-subsidized rates and some service-quality and network targets to
certain segments of the public. These service targets would not have been
achieved under unregulated competition; competitive, unregulated
telecommunications carriers focus on serving high-usage businesses in
dense urban areas (the profitable cream of telecommunications customers),
102
not rural areas or low-usage households.
The regulator could have proposed several forms of compensation to
MATAV’s shareholders in connection with advancing the date for
competition. As in the reported negotiations between CANTV and the
103
Venezuelan regulator, the Hungarian regulator could have proposed to
relieve MATAV of various investment and performance requirements over
the remaining term of the concession agreement. This change would have
reduced MATAV’s obligations to invest in rural areas (that would not be
profitable and would remain a cost disadvantage for the national carrier as
it faced selective competition for urban business customers) or to invest in
service upgrades for residential customers (who would not have
competitive alternatives for several years). A second form of compensation
would be to accelerate the rate rebalancing and rate increases that had been
scheduled to be gradually implemented over the exclusivity period. This
step could allow MATAV to prepare for competition sooner, and could be
combined with allowing higher short-term earnings for MATAV (until
competition constrained the earnings). A third form of compensation would
104
follow the surcharge applied to competitors’ services in Mexico. While
such a surcharge would have attracted opposition from other carriers and
possibly also from foreign regulators, it would have temporarily decreased
the harm to MATAV of competitive entry prior to the completion of its rate
rebalancing, as well as the burden on MATAV of unprofitable service and
network obligations.
102. See Warren G. Lavey, The Public Policies that Changed the Telephone Industry
into Unregulated Monopolies: Lessons from Around 1915, 39 FED. COMM. L.J. 171 (1987).
103. See infra Part III.A.2.
104. See infra Part III.A.1.
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Some segments of the public would be worse off under the
combination of early competition and changes in the concession, than
under continuation with the obligations in the concession agreement. The
concession agreement established not only a multiyear set of rights and
obligations for the carrier, but also a multiyear set of rights for various
segments of the public (which were important for political approval of the
105
privatization). While the beneficiaries of early competition were likely to
be largely urban business users, the beneficiaries of the concession
included residential and rural subscribers. The regulator could have
compensated the residential and rural subscribers who would be harmed by
the changes in the concession through a universal service fund or other
mechanism. For example, all carriers could contribute a portion of their
revenues to a fund to help support the rates that residential and rural
subscribers would be charged under competition, or to help support the
costs of expanding and upgrading rural networks.
Suppose that the regulator determined that the amount of benefits
flowing from early competition would exceed the amount of benefits that
would have to be allocated to MATAV and some segments of the public in
changing from the concession agreement. Under this assumption, in a
world of economically rational actors and low transaction costs, the
regulator should have been able to achieve amendment of the concession
agreement by mutual consent. If MATAV held out for a windfall gain, then
the regulator could have invoked the provision allowing it to modify the
concession agreement unilaterally for “consumer interest” and “economic
106
development” reasons and pay MATAV compensation.
In conclusion, this discussion of the Hungarian experience dealt with
two points. First, penalties stated in a long-term plan were applied in some
instances. Clear specification of the standards and penalties is helpful in
avoiding disputes over enforcing a multiyear agreement. Second, even with
the government’s attempts to promote competition midway through the
exclusivity period, the multiyear plan likely still yielded benefits. The plan
stated some clear as well as some unclear commitments for an eight-year
period. The provisions on competitive entry proved to be unclear; the
government’s actions on competition likely were inconsistent with the
expectations of the national carrier and its investors about a key provision
105. See LEVY & SPILLER, supra note 16, at 37, 78, 141-43 (describing political aspects
of distributional demands in telecom privatizations in Jamaica and Chile).
106. See MATAV PROSPECTUS, supra note 83, at 12. Without going into the details of
the specific formula for compensation in the concession agreement and the Hungarian laws,
common formulations for damages from breach of contract would have required the
regulator to compensate MATAV for the harm caused to it from the lost exclusivity. See 5
ARTHUR LINTON CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 1002 (1964).
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in the plan. The usual alternative to stated, albeit unclear, commitments is
preserving regulatory discretion to transform the telecommunications sector
through short-term, piecemeal decisions. The plan likely created a better
framework for investments, operations, and even discussing regulatory
changes over time compared to the usual, unmapped alternative.

B. Restructuring United States Interstate Access Charges and
Universal Service Funding
The next example of a multiyear promise comes from an order
107
adopted by the FCC in May 2000. Through a five-year plan, the order
reforms the charges paid by long-distance carriers to local exchange
carriers for originating and terminating calls, called “access charges,” as
well as the universal service support mechanism. While the scope of this
FCC plan and its duration are less than those in the concession agreements
for Mexico, Venezuela, and Hungary, this order was viewed by the FCC as
a major achievement in taking an integrated, predictable approach to
important pricing issues. The FCC found that the five-year plan would
provide “relative certainty in the marketplace” and that the plan would give
all parties “a much clearer blueprint for developing their business plans and
108
attracting capital.”
The plan made four major changes in access charges and universal
109
service funding. It eliminated one element of access charges through
which long-distance carriers paid part of the non-traffic-sensitive costs of
local loops; increased the flat monthly charges imposed on residential lines
in four annual steps, with the last two steps implemented only after the
FCC conducted a study and made findings on the appropriateness of the
charges; recharacterized and set a factor in the formula for price caps
applicable to access charges; and established a transitional universal service
110
fund to provide support for poor and rural customers.
There are several reasons that the FCC adopted a multiyear plan
addressing both access charge and universal service issues. There was a
107. Access Charge Reform, Sixth Report and Order in CC Docket Numbers 96-262 and
94-1, 15 F.C.C.R. 12962, 20 Comm. Reg. (P & F) 636 (2000) [hereinafter CALLS Plan],
aff’d in part and rev’d in part sub nom. Tex. Office of Pub. Utils. Counsel v. FCC, 265 F.3d
313 (5th Cir. 2001), cert. denied sub nom. Nat’l Ass’n of State Util. Consumer Advocates v.
FCC, 122 S. Ct. 1537 (2002).
108. CALLS Plan, supra note 107, at para. 37. The FCC quoted with approval the
comments of the Massachusetts Department of Telecommunications and Energy:
“Resolving so many contentious issues . . . as [this] plan does, reduces this uncertainty to the
point that it should not be a significant factor in capital investment.” Id.
109. Tex. Pub. Utils. Counsel v. FCC, 265 F.3d 313, 320 (5th Cir. 2001); CALLS Plan,
supra note 107, para. 29-30, 70.
110. Tex. Pub. Utils. Counsel, 265 F.3d at 320.
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confluence of issues pending at the FCC during this time. The
Telecommunications Act of 1996 directed the FCC to take a wide variety
111
of actions. One of the main goals was to increase competition in local
exchange services, including competition for access services. Another
legislative priority was to continue the provision of affordable telephone
service to all Americans, but to replace implicit subsidies with an explicit
112
mechanism that was consistent with competition.
The FCC conducted rulemaking proceedings on these and many other
issues in the months and years following passage of the legislation. In May
1997, the FCC issued an order reforming access charges; this order was
113
upheld on appeal in 1998. The FCC viewed the rate mechanisms in that
order as only transitional and subject to further proceedings; carriers had
raised various issues to the FCC about implementing some charges, and in
2000 the FCC observed that a rate element introduced in that order created
114
market inefficiencies. Also in 1997, the FCC issued an order revising the
productivity factor in the price cap formula for access charges; this order
was overturned on court review as arbitrary and capricious, and remanded
115
back to the FCC. A third order, adopted in 1997, sought gradually to
remove implicit subsidies from access charges and replace them with an
explicit universal service fund; parts of this order were reversed and
116
remanded in 1999.
Aside from these related pending proceedings, the multiyear nature of
the plan grew out of the FCC’s desire to avoid sharp increases in some
rates, referred to as “rate shock,” especially in rates that would threaten the

111. See Draft FCC Implementation Schedule for the Telecommunications Act of 1996,
at ftp://www.fcc.gov/pub/Reports/implsched.old (Jan. 13, 1997) [hereinafter
Implementation Schedule]
112. CALLS Plan, supra note 107, para. 4; see Warren G. Lavey, Some Legal Puzzles in
the 1996 Statutory Provisions for Universal Telecommunications Services, in MAKING
UNIVERSAL SERVICE POLICY: ENHANCING THE PROCESS THROUGH MULTIDISCIPLINARY
EVALUATION 179 (Barbara Cherry et al. eds., 1999).
113. Access Charge Reform, First Report and Order, 12 F.C.C.R. 15982, 7 Comm. Reg.
(P & F) 1209 (1997), aff’d sub nom. S.W. Bell v. FCC, 153 F.3d 523 (8th Cir. 1998)
[hereinafter Access Charge Reform First Report and Order].
114. CALLS Plan, supra note 107, paras. 19-20.
115. Price Cap Performance Review for Local Exch. Carriers, Fourth Report and Order
in CC Docket No. 94-1 and Second Report and Order in CC Docket No. 96-262, 12
F.C.C.R. 16642, 8 Comm. Reg. (P & F) 119 (1997), rev’d sub nom. U.S. Tel. Ass’n v. FCC,
188 F.3d 521 (D.C. Cir. 1999) [hereinafter Price Cap Performance Review Fourth Report
and Order].
116. Federal-State Joint Bd. on Universal Serv., Report and Order, 12 F.C.C.R. 8776, 7
Comm. Reg. (P & F) 109 (1997), aff’d in part and rev’d in part sub nom. Tex. Pub. Utils.
Counsel, 183 F.3d, appealed after remand and remanded in part by 265 F.3d 313 (5th Cir.
2001) [hereinafter Joint Bd. on Universal Serv. Report and Order].
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affordability of services to some residential users. Another reason for
committing to several reforms spread over several years was the FCC’s
recognition that the access charges at the time of the order, or even after
implementing the first step of the reforms, created incentives for inefficient
118
investments and other multiyear decisions. Only by clearly committing to
further reforms could the FCC hope to lessen the inefficiencies occurring
during the gradual transition. Accordingly, the FCC sought to develop a
clear but gradual “transition to a more economically rational approach to
119
access charges and universal service.”
A final reason for the multiyear plan is that it developed through an
agreement involving “four of the five largest local exchange companies and
120
two of the three largest long-distance companies.” Typically, FCC orders
evolve from a proposal developed by the FCC staff, or a request filed by a
single carrier. Since the breakup of the local exchange and long-distance
121
operations of AT&T in 1984, the parties to the agreement had fought
over access charges and universal service funding in proceedings at the
FCC, judicial review of FCC orders, and lobbying for legislation. The plan
reflected the desire by these carriers to have a comprehensive solution and
certainty instead of piecemeal rulemakings and uncertainty. The FCC put
out the plan for public comments, and the group modified its agreement
122
several times after initially filing it with the FCC. Ultimately the FCC
adopted the proposal; the FCC said that it was exercising its independent
judgment and found that the proposal “falls easily within the range of
123
reasonable solutions to the problems it addresses.”
Three further points about this multiyear plan are interesting. First,
the FCC’s commitment to a five-year plan was never rock solid. The
planned increases in the flat monthly charges for residential lines scheduled
to be implemented in 2002 and 2003 were subject to findings of a
124
proceeding to be commenced in late 2001. This contingency allowed the
117. See CALLS Plan, supra note 107, paras. 26-27.
118. See id. paras. 76-79.
119. Id. para. 27.
120. Id. para. 1 n.1, para. 28.
121. United States v. Western Elec. Co., 569 F. Supp. 1057 (D.D.C. 1983), aff’d sub
nom. California v. United States, 464 U.S. 1013 (1983).
122. CALLS Plan, supra note 107, n.1; Tex. Pub. Utils. Counsel v. FCC, 265 F.3d 313,
325-27 (5th Cir. 2001).
123. CALLS Plan, supra note 107, para. 49.
124. Id. at para. 83. On September 17, 2001, the FCC commenced this proceeding and
requested that carriers submit cost information. Initiation of Cost Review Proceeding for
Residential and Single-Line Bus. Subscriber Line Charge (SLC) Caps, Public Notice, 16
F.C.C.R. 16705 (2001). In June 2002, the FCC adopted an order finding that the further
increases in flat monthly charges anticipated in the CALLS Plan were necessary to fulfill the
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FCC to demonstrate its commitment to keeping residential local service
125
affordable. In addition, the FCC stated the following reservation about all
aspects of the plan: “[T]he Commission has the authority to modify the
rules we adopt today before the end of the five-year term . . . . This Order
addresses a marketplace that is dynamic and evolving, and the Commission
126
may exercise its authority should the need arise.” Perhaps the FCC
thought that this reservation was important to shield the plan from judicial
reversal because there is little precedent for a comprehensive five-year plan
127
in court reviews of FCC orders. Alternatively, the FCC may have been
reluctant to give up its discretion to adjust access charges and universal
service funding, which had been subject to so many adjustments over the
preceding years, especially in light of the opposition—by some carriers,
state commissions, and consumer groups—to some aspects of the plan. In
any case, the FCC did not discuss how these contingencies would likely
affect the degree of regulatory certainty produced by the plan for business
investment and operations decisions.
Next, the uncertainties embedded in the FCC order were compounded
by judicial review. About fifteen months after the FCC adopted its order,
the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the parts of the order involving
the structure of access charges and the increased flat monthly charges for
residential lines, but reversed the parts changing the price cap formula and
128
establishing a transitional universal service fund. The court held that the
FCC lacked a rational basis for determining the amounts of the latter
factors, and remanded these matters to the FCC. As FCC Chairman Powell
observed in November 2001, a decision that fails to withstand judicial
129
scrutiny is “of no use at all.” When the order was adopted, carriers had to
develop business plans in light of: the uncertainties about the timing of
judicial review; its outcome; when the FCC would issue an order on
remand if parts of the original order were reversed; how any such
subsequent order would differ from the first; and then again the shadow of
judicial review for the subsequent order. While the standard for judicial
FCC’s access charge reform objectives. Cost Review Proceeding for Residential and SingleLine Bus. Subscriber Line (SLC) Caps, Order, 17 F.C.C.R. 10868, 26 Comm. Reg. (P & F)
1379 (2002).
125. Tex. Pub. Utils. Counsel, 265 F.3d at 323, 325.
126. CALLS Plan, supra note 107, para. 36 n.45.
127. See Tex. Pub. Utils. Counsel, 265 F.3d at 325 (“The FCC has reasonably exercised
its predictive judgment . . . . If, in light of the actual market developments, the Commission
determines that competition is not having the anticipated effect on access charges, the
agency presumably will revisit the issue.”) (quoting Southwestern Bell v. FCC, 153 F.3d
523, 547 (8th Cir. 1998)).
128. Tex. Pub. Utils. Counsel, 265 F.3d at 329.
129. Powell, supra note 19, at 2.
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review gives general presumptions in favor of orders adopted by regulatory
130
commissions, the legal standard for vacating and remanding an agency’s
order does not explicitly weigh the costs of uncertainties that would result
from overturning a plan intended to provide long-term predictability in a
marketplace.
Finally, the FCC followed the example of this plan, which was
applicable to large local exchange carriers, with another five-year plan
applicable to small local exchange carriers. The second plan, adopted in
October 2001, again addressed both access charge and universal service
issues, and again evolved from a proposal developed by a group of
131
carriers. The FCC noted that it would continue to refine its policies and
was committed to investigating alternative regulatory methods that would
132
benefit both these carriers and their customers. In adopting the order, the
FCC also began a proceeding on other proposed changes to increase the
133
efficiency and competitiveness of these carriers’ access services. Thus,
this plan was intended to provide only a limited degree of regulatory
certainty for these services over the five-year period.

C. Implementing Automatic Location Identification Capabilities
for United States Wireless Services
The last example of a multiyear promise deals with the FCC’s efforts
to cause cellular and personal communications services (“PCS”) carriers to
implement automatic location identification capabilities for calls to
emergency services (“E911”). The proceeding illustrates the difficulties
regulators encounter in trying to decrease the uncertainty of deploying new
134
communications technologies. While regulators control access charges
and universal funding mechanisms, they do not control, and often have

130. Chevron U.S.A. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837, 842-44 (1984)
(allowing for reversal of an agency’s decision only if it is “arbitrary, capricious, or
manifestly contrary to the statute”); MCI Telecomm. Corp. v. FCC, 675 F.2d 408, 413 (D.C.
Cir. 1982); Nat’l Ass’n of Regulatory Util. Comm’rs v. FCC, 737 F.2d 1095, 1134 (D.C.
Cir. 1984) (noting the “breadth of the Commission’s statutory discretion to balance the
multiple goals in the Communications Act”).
131. Multi-Ass’n Group (MAG) Plan for Regulation of Interstate Servs. of Non-Price
Cap Incumbent Local Exchange Carriers and Interexchange Carriers, Second Report and
Order and Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking in CC Docket Number 00-256, 16
F.C.C.R. 19613, para. 1, 25 Comm. Reg. (P & F) 1 (2001) [hereinafter MAG].
132. Id. para. 13.
133. Id. para. 212.
134. See also Comms. Assistance for Law Enforcement Act, Third Report and Order, 14
F.C.C.R. 16794, 17 Comm. Reg. (P & F) 470 (1999) (explaining schedule and cost-recovery
procedures for deploying technologies to facilitate electronic surveillance), vacated and
remanded sub nom. U.S. Telecomm. Ass’n v. FCC, 227 F.3d 450 (D.C. Cir. 2000).
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poor visibility into, technological developments for some new services for
a group of licensed carriers also involving equipment suppliers,
interconnected carriers, and other non-carrier entities that play roles in
provisioning the services. Repeated rule changes and recent waivers in this
proceeding point to the fine line between enforceable commitments and
nonenforceable statements of intentions.
In 1996, the FCC adopted rules to stimulate the improvement in
135
handling calls to emergency services by wireless carriers. The order
recognized the benefits of providing automatic identification of the caller’s
location to emergency services providers. The order established two sets of
requirements. Phase I requires the carrier to deliver to the emergency
service the location of the cell site or base station receiving the emergency
call. These capabilities were to be initiated within twelve months and
completed within eighteen months after issuance of the rules. Phase II
requires the carrier to deliver to the emergency services providers more
specific latitude and longitude location information on the caller. These
more advanced capabilities were to be achieved within five years after
issuance of the rules.
The FCC’s five-year implementation schedule for Phase II evolved
136
from a proposal developed by the FCC’s staff two years earlier. Initially,
the wireless carriers opposed a fixed, mandatory schedule while the public
137
safety organizations supported it. The carriers stated that the systems to
achieve the Phase II accuracy objectives had not been manufactured,
standardized, or field-tested. More than a year after the FCC issued its
proposal, the five-year schedule gained the support of a consensus
agreement by the leading association of wireless carriers and
138
representatives of public safety organizations. Some suppliers of location
systems filed comments stating that the systems could be developed to
139
meet the five-year schedule.
Some comments favored allowing the location identification
capabilities to develop based on the demands in the marketplace at a
market-driven pace. Others urged the FCC to limit its role to encouraging

135. E911 Order, supra note 28, para. 10. See also Hatfield, supra note 28, at 6-11.
136. Revision to the Comm’n’s Rules to Ensure Compatibility with Enhanced 911
Emergency Calling Sys., Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 9 F.C.C.R. 6170, 3 Comm. Reg.
(P & F) 2193 (1994).
137. E911 Order, supra note 28, paras. 23, 55-57.
138. Id. para. 57.
139. Id. paras. 55-56. As for costs, the FCC noted a huge range of estimates in the
record, from $510 million to $7.5 billion depending on the technology, and found that it was
reasonable to conclude that these costs were “likely to decline in the future.” Id. para. 62.
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140

voluntary development of the capabilities. Instead, the FCC found that a
mandatory implementation schedule was necessary to ensure expeditious
deployment of technologies to enhance public safety communications. The
FCC sought to impose a schedule that was “rigorous without being
141
impossible or commercially self-defeating.”
The FCC modified its rules several times over the years following
adoption of the initial schedule, including allowance for a handset-based
142
technology that was not anticipated in the initial order. If a carrier chose
to implement location identification capabilities through handsets, it could
phase in the availability on an initial schedule from March 2001 through
December 2005. The FCC also required carriers to file implementation
reports detailing their progress and plans. In an order adopted in August
2000, the FCC found that “much progress has been made in developing
technologies to make wireless E911 a reality, although much still remains
143
to be done.” That order extended the initiation date for handset-based
technologies by seven months, modified the phase-in schedule and granted
a further waiver to one carrier. Finding that location technologies “are
already, or will soon be, available that provide a reasonable prospect for
carriers to comply with the E911 Phase II requirements,” the FCC stated
that any waiver request must be “specific, focused and limited in scope,
144
and with a clear path to full compliance.”
The schedule came under strong fire from many wireless carriers in
the final year of the five-year period. While the leading wireless carriers
had engaged in field test and/or development work with manufacturers,
none of the carriers was implementing the capabilities according to the
schedule. The carriers pointed to the failure of their vendors (who they
claimed were beyond their control) to supply equipment necessary to
satisfy the accuracy requirements in the rules. In October 2001, the FCC
conditionally approved, with certain modifications, the compliance plans of
five nationwide carriers and initiated enforcement investigations regarding
140. Id. para. 61.
141. Id. One party argued for an “evolutionary path for the E911 rules because the
timing of implementation is affected by ‘economic, operational and technological
feasibility’” (quoting comments filed by a public safety organization). Id.
142. Revision of the Comm’n’s Rules to Ensure Compatibility with Enhanced 911
Emergency Calling Sys., Memorandum Opinion and Order, 12 F.C.C.R. 22665, 10 Comm.
Reg. (P & F) 1090 (1997); Revision of the Comm’n’s Rules to Ensure Compatibility with
Enhanced 911 Emergency Calling Sys., Second Report and Order, 14 F.C.C.R. 10954, 16
Comm. Reg. (P & F) 1 (1999); Revision of the Comm’n’s Rules to Ensure Compatibility
with Enhanced 911 Emergency Calling Sys., Fourth Memorandum Opinion and Order, 15
F.C.C.R. 17442, 22 Comm. Reg. (P & F) 310 (2000) [hereinafter 2000 E911 Order].
143. 2000 E911 Order, supra note 142, para. 3.
144. Id. para. 44.
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145

some carriers. These orders extended the initial deployment milestone;
preserved the 2005 milestone for completing deployment; warned of strong
enforcement of the revised milestones; required the carriers to file quarterly
progress reports; and opened an inquiry into technical issues, including
technology standards, development of hardware and software, and supply
conditions. Three carriers quickly filed petitions for reconsideration,
claiming that the waivers were too harsh in holding the carriers to the
146
milestones, which they had proposed, regardless of the availability of
compliant technology from suppliers and predetermining that enforcement
actions would be invoked against carriers in cases of noncompliance.
In May and October 2002, the FCC and two major carriers entered
into consent decrees that included a $100,000 and a $2 million “voluntary
contribution” to the U.S. Treasury and further payment obligations if the
147
carrier misses deployment benchmarks. Also, about a year after adopting
the revised deployment and reporting requirements in its October 2001
order, the FCC received a consultant’s report on technical and operational
issues with wireless E911 deployment, and requested comments in order to
assess deployment issues and to consider methods to overcome deployment
148
issues. The report pointed to various issues not addressed in the FCC’s

145. See Fact Sheet: E911 Phase II Decisions, FCC Wireless Bureau, available at
http://ftp.fcc.gov/Bureaus/Wireless/News_Releases/2001/nw/01279.pdf (Oct. 2001). See
also Revision of the Comm’n’s Rules to Ensure Compatibility with Enhanced 911
Emergency Calling Systems (AT&T Wireless Svcs., Inc.), Order, 16 F.C.C.R. 18253
(2001); Revision of the Comm’n’s Rules to Ensure Compatibility with Enhanced 911
Emergency Calling Systems (Nextel Comm., Inc.), Order, 16 F.C.C.R. 18277 (2001);
Revision of the Comm’n’s Rules to Ensure Compatibility with Enhanced 911 Emergency
Calling Systems (Cingular Wireless), Order, 16 F.C.C.R. 18305 (2001); Revision of the
Comm’n’s Rules to Ensure Compatibility with Enhanced 911 Emergency Calling Systems
(Sprint PCS), Order, 16 F.C.C.R. 18330 (2001); Revision of the Comm’n’s Rules to Ensure
Compatibility with Enhanced 911 Emergency Calling Systems (Verizon Wireless), Order,
16 F.C.C.R. 18364 (2001) [hereinafter collectively 2001 E911 Order]; Wireless
Communications and Public Safety Act: Oversight Hearing on Wireless E-911 Compliance
(P.L. 106-81) Before the Senate Subcomm. on Communications of the Commerce, Science,
and Transp. Comm., 107th Cong. (Oct. 16, 2001) (Testimony of Thomas J. Sugrue, Chief,
Wireless Telecommunications Bureau, FCC) [hereinafter Sugrue Testimony].
146. Cingular, Nextel, and Verizon File Petitions For Reconsideration of Comm’n
Orders on Wireless E911 Phase II Waiver Requests, Public Notice, 16 F.C.C.R. 20438
(2001); 2001 E911 Order, supra note 145, at 18272 (statement of Comm’r Michael Copps).
147. Press Release, FCC, FCC and Cingular Wireless LLC Enter into $100,000 Consent
Decree Regarding E911 Rules (May 9, 2002) at http://www.fcc.gov/Daily_Releases/Daily_
Business/2002/db0509/DOC-222264A1.pdf; AT&T Wireless Svcs., Inc., 2002 FCC LEXIS
5087 (Oct. 9, 2002).
148. Wireless Telecommunications Bureau Seeks Comment on Report on Technical and
Operational Wireless E911 Issues, Public Notice, DA 02-266 (Oct. 16, 2002), available at
http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs_public/attachmatch/DA-02-2666A1.doc; Hatfield, supra note
28, at iii.
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prior orders, including the responsibilities of, and recovery of costs for,
landline carriers in upgrading their existing wireline E911 systems to
support wireless E911, and the complexities in working with approximately
8,000 public safety agencies having a wide range of capabilities and
funding.
Two questions arise from this experience. First, in light of the failure
by carriers to meet the initial implementation milestone and the FCC’s
numerous modifications and waivers of its rules, how did the “mandatory”
schedule affect the conduct of the industry and the regulator? Second, does
the record support the view that the commitment to a deployment schedule
promoted efficiency?
On the effects of the schedule on the industry and the regulator, this
proceeding illustrates the “holding their feet to the fire” approach to
regulation. The FCC does not have jurisdiction over telecommunications
equipment manufacturers and system suppliers, and was not in a position to
dictate development and production of this technology by them. While the
FCC has jurisdiction over the carriers, the regulator lacked the technical
capability and willingness to micromanage the carriers’ relationships with
their suppliers. Nor was the regulator willing to require the carriers to
spend billions of dollars on one technology when the carriers claimed that
an effective, lower-cost technology would be available “soon.” What the
FCC could and did do was to establish the schedule as mandatory for the
carriers, repeatedly speak out on its commitment to bringing about the
public interest benefits of the technology, and show only limited
willingness to vary from these rules in light of emerging technology and
market conditions. Compared to letting the market evolve without
regulatory intervention, the schedule had the effect of creating stronger
incentives for equipment manufacturers and system suppliers to develop
new technologies, and for carriers to devote resources to product
development with suppliers, field tests, and deployment planning.
How strong were the effects of the schedule on the industry? The
schedule, together with threats of enforcement actions, filings of
implementation plans and only limited waivers, gave some push to the
149
industry. On the other hand, the carriers no doubt anticipated some
flexibility from the regulator, especially when the carriers could place the
blame on their suppliers and the FCC repeatedly had modified the schedule
and technical requirements. The FCC’s orders described general progress
149. See Hatfield, supra note 28, at 12 (in a report dated Oct. 15, 2002, the consultant
finds that “with the pressure of the Commission deadlines” the “initial discovery,
development and evaluation phase seems largely completed” and “the focus has shifted
increasingly to actual implementation”).
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by the carriers and their suppliers. Perhaps more would have been
accomplished by the carriers and their suppliers if the FCC had earlier
signaled a tougher enforcement posture. In a statement accompanying the
October 2001 waivers, Chairman Powell stated his determination to
achieve complete availability of wireless location capability:
Given that this service can save lives, I trust that the carriers, the
manufacturers and public safety authorities will work tirelessly to get
this service to people as soon before that deadline as possible. It is not
good enough to go for a gentleman’s “C.” This test requires an “A+”
150
effort.

It is not clear whether the chairman was critical of prior orders for binding
the industry only to a “C”-level push for deployment.
The schedule adopted in 1996 influenced subsequent actions by the
FCC. The schedule created a promise by the FCC to public safety
151
organizations and Congress. Through legislation and hearings, Congress
embraced the rapid deployment of wireless location capabilities. With the
strong growth of wireless usage and wireless calls to emergency services
during the five-year period, changing market conditions increased the
political pressure on the FCC to turn its promise into reality. In each order
that allowed for slippage of milestones, the FCC had to demonstrate that it
had lost none of its commitment to this goal.
We can now analyze whether the FCC’s multiyear commitments in its
1996 order promoted productive efficiency. The FCC’s order decreased the
uncertainty about when carriers would implement location technologies
and the performance standards. Even though the possibility of waivers
hung over this process, carriers at least had to create a record of attempted
compliance on which to seek waivers. The leading wireless carriers and
some of their suppliers took the schedule seriously enough to engage in
product development, field testing, and implementation planning. The
waivers disrupted some business plans for the initial milestone but
preserved much of the rollout schedule for the subsequent years. Absent the
FCC’s orders, carriers and their suppliers would have done even more
guessing about when market demands would have resulted in orders for
this technology, or the possibility of the FCC, Congress, or state and local
authorities mandating a deployment schedule and technical standards.
150. 2001 E911 Order, supra note 145, at 18265 (separate statement of Chairman
Michael Powell).
151. See Wireless Communications and Public Safety Act of 1999, Pub. L. No. 106-81,
113 Stat. 1286 (1999); Sugrue Testimony, supra note 145; Oral Testimony of Thomas J.
Sugrue before the Subcommittee on Telecommunications, Trade and Consumer Protection,
at http://ftp.fcc.gov/Bureaus/Wireless/Notices/2001/sugrue101.doc (June 14, 2001); Peter P.
Ten Eyck, Dial 911 and Report a Congressional Empty Promise: The Wireless
Communications and Public Safety Act of 1999, 54 FED. COMM. L.J. 53 (2001).
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The five-year commitment was not just the FCC’s shot in the
darkness of distant future wireless technologies. Rather, the carriers had
agreed to this schedule and some vendors went on record supporting the
152
availability of systems in that time frame. The carriers may have
perceived opportunities for productive efficiencies from not facing a
shorter implementation deadline, or from less uncertainty about when
location requirements would be imposed on them. The vendors may have
perceived that the FCC would expand the market opportunity for these new
technologies.
Given that the FCC could not control the technology development by
equipment manufacturers or public safety agencies, there were some types
of inefficiencies from locking carriers into an implementation schedule and
performance standards. Carriers had to expend resources for testing
technologies and convincing the FCC to grant waivers. The mandatory
schedule caused the regulator to make formal adjustments to the rules
153
several times in light of technology and market developments. Each
petition and order required more resources from carriers and the regulator
than would have been employed with a less firm commitment, such as an
ongoing panel to study and encourage location technology deployment.
Also, some potential suppliers might have invested heavily in product
development, field testing with carriers, and manufacturing capacity in
anticipation of substantial orders for the October 2001 implementation
date. The waivers changed the competitive landscape for suppliers, perhaps
depriving rewards from those suppliers that came closest to meeting the
technical and availability requirements established in the prior orders. If
these suppliers had operated in a market without a regulatory schedule for
deployment, they could have avoided some costs.
In summary, the FCC’s commitment to a deployment schedule and
technical standards was built on guesses about technology developments
that neither the regulator, nor the carriers, could control. The five-year
promise was never written in stone. It was subject to both interim
modifications in response to technological changes and last-minute
waivers. While the FCC’s approach likely fostered some efficiencies as
well as some inefficiencies compared to ad hoc, short-term regulatory
decisions, the balance probably weighs in favor of the efficiencies. The
FCC’s attempts to bring clarity to this area for a five-year planning horizon
helped guide the carriers, their suppliers, and public safety agencies.
Technology developments on this politically hot issue faced inherent
uncertainties. The FCC’s commitment involved many adjustments over
152. See 2000 E911 Order, supra note 142.
153. See sources cited supra note 142.
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time, but its intent is admirable. It may have been easier for the FCC to
limit its role to issuing annual reports on developments in this area or
addressing certain deployment-related issues, such as how carriers could
recover their costs from deploying this capability. Instead, the FCC
recognized that some uncertainty facing carriers, their suppliers, and public
safety agencies needed to be removed in order to accomplish the policy
goal of rapid development and deployment of this capability. The multiyear
promise, while unstable and imperfect as to timing and technical standards,
did remove some uncertainty, and thereby promoted productive efficiency.

IV. LESSONS ON MULTIYEAR REGULATORY PROMISES
This Section draws two lessons from the analysis of various multiyear
regulatory promises in the preceding Section. First, under some conditions
regulators have departed from a step-by-step approach to adopt multiyear
plans. Regulators could make more use of atypical procedures to achieve
predictable multiyear plans for other issues. Second, such plans can
produce efficiency gains compared to piecemeal, ad hoc, or short-term
regulatory decisions. Through analysis of a U.S. plan intended to promote
local telecommunications competition which has been plagued by
uncertainties, this point also explains that clear standards and a fixed
schedule can promote efficiency gains.

A. Regulators Do, Under Some Conditions, Make and Keep
Multiyear Promises
The five multiyear promises analyzed in Section II developed from
diverse conditions and do not reflect “ordinary” regulatory decisions or
decision-making processes. Each of these examples involves an agreement
with major industry actors, not just a regulatory evaluation of a record and
creation of rules. Such atypical approaches could be used by regulators
more frequently, by encouraging or mediating industry negotiations aimed
at long-term solutions. When diverse carriers and other interested parties
are polarized and litigious, regulators have difficulty establishing a stable,
multiyear regulatory framework. A review of the conditions and processes
underlying these ambitious regulatory plans may be helpful in guiding
future orders and processes.
The lesson here is that multiyear regulatory promises develop when
regulators and the telecommunications industry focus on the benefits of
reducing uncertainties over time, not just resolving a dispute or establishing
an immediately applicable rate or obligation of uncertain duration. Under
these conditions, regulators can and have made complex, politically
sensitive multiyear promises.
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Privatizations

The three examples of regulatory plans made in connection with sales
of strategic interests in national telephone carriers were ambitious. The
plans were intended to provide predictability for long periods (six to ten
years) and address major changes in the full scope of national regulatory
issues, including rates, network expansion and modernization, servicequality improvements and competition. The plans are especially impressive
when compared to the preceding governmental actions in the
telecommunications sectors of these countries, typically limited to isolated
rate and network construction decisions to comply with general
governmental political priorities as to economic and social policies.
The plans were intended to sell the privatization transaction to two
audiences. Both audiences were very focused on having a clear long-term
picture of regulation as well as definite milestones.
On one hand, potential buyers for the strategic interest included major
foreign telecommunications operators. In developing business plans for
investing billions of dollars for the initial stock purchase and network
improvements, the potential buyers needed to develop annual forecasts of
revenues and expenses extending over many years. The buyers wanted rate
rebalancing before competitive entry, and were willing to commit to
gradual rate rebalancing only when the regulator gave assurance that
competitive entry would be sufficiently delayed. Similarly, the buyers were
willing to commit to network expansion and service quality improvements,
including in unprofitable rural areas. The buyers, however, wanted a
reasonable schedule and clear standards so that they would not be exposed
to unexpected penalties or expenditures. With little or no precedent for
telecommunications regulation by an independent agency in these
countries, the buyers wanted many issues applicable to future years
addressed in the concession agreements. Additionally, the buyers
recognized the unique conditions surrounding the transaction, which
perhaps gave them greater influence over regulatory decisions than they
would have in the future.
On the other hand, the business plans needed to be accepted by the
domestic political audience. Politicians wanted to see commitments to
expanding the networks in order to serve the many people waiting for
service. They also wanted to see service-quality improvements, network
modernization to support economic development, and rate changes which
protected subscribers from sharp rate increases. With the global move to
telecommunications competition, domestic politicians wanted to make sure
that their countries would introduce competition without unreasonable
delay.
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Along with the multiyear focus of the audiences for the plans, the
transactions brought together unusual teams to craft the multiyear
regulatory promises. The governments were advised by teams of
investment bankers, international telecommunications consultants, and
international lawyers, all with expertise on telecommunications regulations.
Instead of relying solely on the staff of the regulatory agency, the plans
were developed with advisors having a more long-term orientation to the
carrier’s business and telecommunications regulations.
Now consider the conditions influencing regulators to keep these
multiyear promises. Part of what tied the regulators to their plans in the
following years was related to the transaction. The buyers paid serious
money to the government, and had contractual remedies for violations of
the concession agreements which are not normally available to carriers
154
when regulators change their rules. These transactions also preceded the
national carriers’ initial public offerings, which involved further sales of
shares held by the governments. These subsequent sales gave the
governments incentives to abide by the multiyear promises and not to
impose new onerous requirements or restrictions on the carriers. Similarly,
telecommunications privatizations in those countries were often followed
by privatizations in other sectors, giving the government further reason to
establish a reputation as an honest player that keeps its promises.
Aside from the context of the transactions, these multiyear,
multifaceted plans reflect a balancing of many interests. Not adhering to
these promises would require addressing the expectations of various
interest groups. Most changes would benefit some interest groups while
harming others. While the examples show that it is possible to work
through some modifications, such as altering some service-quality
standards, it is much more difficult to make other changes, such as early
competitive entry. Early competitive entry would make it harder for the
regulator to obtain network expansion in rural areas and gradual increases
in residential local service rates. The carriers would have a stronger
expectation of regulators keeping their promises with regard to a plan’s
aspects that are tied to the interests of some politically influential groups.

2.

FCC Access Charges and Universal Service Plan

The conditions related to the FCC’s multiyear plan for reforming
access charges and universal service funding were quite different from
those pertaining to the three privatizations. The plan emerged out of several
154. See TELMEX PROSPECTUS, supra note 38, at Exhibit: Concession Granted to the
State-Owned Company Teléfonos de México, S.A., Clauses First, Twenty-Fourth; CANTV
PROSPECTUS, supra note 60, at 61; MATAV PROSPECTUS, supra note 83, at 12.
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sources of uncertainty. During the preceding three years, there had been
numerous separate orders which addressed parts of these interrelated
issues. Some of those orders were reversed and remanded, in whole or in
155
part, by the appellate courts. Portions of the regulations that were adopted
in those orders pointed to the temporary nature of the charges, anticipating
further revisions by the FCC. Also, carriers were requesting reconsideration
of at least one element which was proving difficult to implement, and
argued that the FCC’s decisions had not gone far enough in reforming these
156
charges.
While the FCC was continuing to analyze options and develop factual
records on these issues through rulemaking proceedings, some major local
exchange and long-distance carriers worked on a consensus plan. The plan
reflects the participating carriers’ desire to remove some of the uncertainty
surrounding these charges via a predictable, five-year framework. Greater
certainty about moving to lower access charges, even if phased in, would
help these carriers compete (including against carriers that did not have to
impose or pay these charges), plan services and network facilities, and
forecast demand. Without the agreement of these carriers, the FCC would
not likely have committed to this five-year regulatory plan.
Perhaps it was too good to be true. The carriers’ ability to remove
uncertainty through a multiyear regulatory commitment was limited. A
midterm review by the FCC had to be built into the plan to address political
concerns about increasing charges on residential customers. On top of this,
the FCC explicitly reserved its options to change the rules over time,
possibly out of concern that a court would reverse its surrender of
discretion, and possibly out of concern that it would need this discretion to
address changing market conditions. The group supporting the plan did not
include all interested parties; thus, as with most proposals filed with the
FCC, the uncertainty persisted through the FCC’s rulemaking process and
court review. These parties outside of the group which agreed to the
consensus plan preferred the possibility of other regulations, along with the
uncertainty of what the FCC would adopt and when, over the certainty of
the plan’s commitments. Then came court reversal of some elements of the
plan as not supported by the record, leading to more FCC proceedings and
157
uncertainty.

155. See Access Charge Reform First Report and Order, supra note 113; Price Cap
Performance Review Fourth Report and Order, supra note 115; Joint Bd. on Universal
Serv. Report and Order, supra note 116.
156. CALLS Plan, supra note 107, paras. 19, 78-79, 86, 106.
157. Tex. Pub. Utils. Counsel v. FCC, 265 F.3d 313, 329 (5th Cir. 2001).
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FCC Schedule for Wireless E911 Capability

Finally, the main driver behind the five-year plan for wireless E911
capability was political support for the public safety benefits. When the
FCC commenced its rulemaking proceeding, automatic location
identification for landline calls was widely available in the United States,
and the number of wireless calls to public safety agencies was already large
and growing rapidly. Public safety agencies were clamoring for
governmental action to save lives, with widely accepted assumptions that
the technologies could be readily developed and that the benefits would
outweigh any costs imposed on the burgeoning wireless industry. The FCC
needed to show Congress that the regulators were promoting wireless
carriers’ deployment of this capability. It was not enough to point to the
possibility that an unregulated market would produce this capability
eventually, nor to show that the FCC was studying the issue and would take
action at some unspecified future time if deemed warranted based on
158
further information about the technologies.
From the industry perspective, there was substantial uncertainty about
what would be required and when. The wireless industry had succeeded in
avoiding most of the types of regulatory burdens imposed on landline
carriers, such as rate regulation and unbundled interconnections. Although
wireless carriers could point to an increasingly competitive marketplace
that would drive advances in their service offerings, they also were aware
of the active role of governmental authorities in implementing landline
E911 capability and the political support for wireless E911 capability.
Following the FCC’s notice of proposed rulemaking, the carriers argued
that the timing should be determined by the marketplace; the carriers
159
preferred to control the planning without regulatory intervention. When
the industry recognized that this position appeared unacceptable to the
FCC, representatives of the carriers and public safety agencies agreed to a
160
five-year schedule and filed that consensus agreement with the FCC. The
carriers probably viewed this agreement as helping them avoid a more

158. In several other proceedings involving the deployment of new telecommunications
technologies, the FCC took a different approach, combining some rules with monitoring and
with the potential for additional rules if warranted by market conditions. Promotion of
Competitive Networks in Local Telecomm. Mkts., First Report and Order and Further
Notice of Proposed Rulemaking in WT Docket Number 99-217, 15 F.C.C.R. 22983, 22
Comm. Reg. (P & F) 1 (2000). See also Wireless Telecomm. Bureau Requests Comment on
Current State of the Market for Local and Advanced Telecomm. Services in Multitenant
Environments, Public Notice, 16 F.C.C.R. 20971 (2001).
159. E911 Order, supra note 28, paras. 23, 55-57.
160. Id. para. 57.
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aggressive deployment schedule or set of technical standards than the FCC,
Congress, or state and local authorities might have mandated.
The consensus agreement was important for adoption and
enforcement of the five-year plan. Instead of having the FCC adopt the
schedule as its own best guess of what could be reasonably accomplished,
the carriers committed to complying with this schedule. This made it harder
for all parties to justify slippage. The promises by all parties were made in
the context of the FCC’s ongoing review of its technology standards and
readiness to make adjustment for technology developments. Nevertheless,
the mutual promises established a marker in the sands of the uncertain
future of wireless technologies.

B.

Multiyear Regulatory Promises Can Produce Efficiency Gains

The analysis in Section III identified certain efficiency gains from the
five multiyear regulatory plans. Two points emerge from this analysis—
that the promises can produce efficiency gains and that efficiencyenhancing changes can be implemented with benefits redistributed
according to the earlier promises. After explaining these points, this
Section concludes with a discussion of the structure of a U.S. multiyear
promise covering local competition which has yielded some inefficiencies
resulting from continued uncertainties.

1.

Gains from Decreasing Uncertainty

A predictable regulatory framework can promote productive
efficiency by carriers as well as the ability of regulators to obtain their
objectives. Put differently, regulatory decisions setting only interim rules of
indefinite duration and open-ended uses of regulatory discretion to modify
rules can have an opportunity cost for the industry, consumers, and public
policy goals.
Businesses use multiyear plans to guide investments, operations, and
product development. Along with assumptions typical of unregulated
markets regarding technology, demand, costs, competition, and other
market factors, the business plans of telecommunications businesses
include assumptions about regulated rates, network and service
requirements, regulatory rules for competition, and other terms by which
regulators heavily influence the industries. Uncertainties regarding these
regulatory-influenced factors create costs in business decisions, such as:
underutilized facilities when regulators delay authorization for services;
failure to enforce interconnection standards or impose costs which decrease
demand; retroactive upgrades of hardware and software to meet new
regulatory requirements when economies were available if these standards
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were known before some deployments; opportunity costs from not
developing capabilities to offer services because regulators would not
commit to authorizing an offering or pricing it in line with its costs; and so
on.
In some cases, such as the privatization transactions, major
investments would not have been made in the absence of commitments by
the regulators to a detailed, comprehensive plan extending over six- to tenyear periods. In the case of the FCC plan for access charges and universal
service funding, some leading carriers worked hard to reach agreement on a
five-year plan for rates from which they could develop plans for facilities,
interconnection arrangements, and service offerings. The example of the
wireless E911 technology dealt with a multiyear program of development
by manufacturers and field testing by carriers, where knowledge of the
regulators’ performance standards and implementation milestones saved
costs by guiding the technology choices and implementation planning.
From the perspective of regulators trying to implement new
regulations, a multiyear plan can decrease implementation costs which
ultimately are borne by consumers. Also, the industry may be able to
implement a regulatory change earlier if the regulator makes an advanced
commitment to the change. For example, the wireless E911 plan adopted in
1996 likely accelerated the development and deployment of this
technology.

2.

Promises to Redistribute Gains in the Event of Changes

This Author has analyzed several instances in which regulators
sought, or explicitly reserved the right, to change multiyear plans midterm,
including fundamental commitments. The shadow of uncertainty about
such changes can decrease the efficiency gains from a multiyear plan.
Nevertheless, a second point about efficiency benefits is that multiyear
plans can function to redistribute the gains of regulatory changes without
barring changes which would enhance efficiency.
Part of regulators’ reluctance to adopt multiyear plans may be their
concerns about subsequently developing different conclusions which would
enhance efficiency. Such changes may develop from new market
conditions or analyses of options, and could involve different rate
structures, standards for network and service performance, timing and
conditions for competition, or other rule changes. Just as a panel of
regulators would not want to be entirely bound by the decisions of its
predecessors, so too, would a panel of regulators be reluctant to bind its
successors entirely.
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As discussed in connection with the analysis of attempts to accelerate
competition under the privatization plans in Venezuela and Hungary,
multiyear commitments can influence the process and beneficiaries of
regulatory changes, but should not bar regulatory changes which would
enhance efficiency. A plan makes commitments to various interest groups;
a regulatory change which would adversely affect some groups may require
that those groups be compensated for the loss compared to proceeding with
the plan. As long as the change represents a net gain to the country, it
should be possible to arrange such compensation and still proceed with the
change. In other words, a plan which balanced various interests through
one set of regulations can be replaced by another plan which rebalances
these interests through a second set of regulations as long as there is a net
gain to distribute.
In effect, a plan establishes a multiyear baseline set of expectations.
Greater benefits in terms of reduced uncertainty arise from clear,
predictable regulatory commitments. Yet a plan can also produce efficiency
gains by structuring the regulatory commitments as follows: one, the
regulator specifies the future regulations over a term as clearly as possible
at that time; and two, the regulator does not promise that such regulations
will remain unchanged but does promise to give serious consideration to
the conditions specified therein, and compensation for the related
expectations in making any changes. Such compensation can take the form
of agreed remedies according to contractual provisions, trading off against
other regulatory restrictions or obligations in bilateral negotiations, or
otherwise addressing the interests of groups harmed by the change
compared to the baseline conditions. The commitment to engage in this
process of recognizing expectations and redistributing gains results in less
uncertainty than an open-ended characterization of a regulatory decision as
merely interim with no setting of baseline conditions.

3. A Multiyear Promise with Too Much Uncertainty About
Carriers’ Obligations and Regulatory Criteria
The final point is that clarity in commitments and restricting carriers’
and regulators’ discretion decreases uncertainty and promotes efficiency.
This point is illustrated by an area of particularly strong regulatory
turbulence and industry uncertainty involving local exchange competition
in the United States.
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One of the main goals of the Telecommunications Act of 1996 is to
161
open local markets to competition. The legislation removed legal barriers
to competition (such as some state protections of monopolies in local
162
switched services), as well as some economic and technical barriers to
competition (such as requiring that incumbent carriers interconnect with
competitors by offering unbundled network elements, collocation of
163
network facilities, and number portability). The statutory provisions
spawned a long series of FCC rulemaking proceedings, which in time
spawned numerous court reviews and remands, reconsideration
164
proceedings, and complaints. Uncertainty persisted, especially where
rules were adopted as “interim” or “transitional.”
An important multiyear promise in the legislation relied on an
incentive approach to easing some economic and technical barriers to
165
competition. There was much uncertainty surrounding whether carriers
would respond to the incentive and when, as well as how regulators would
judge compliance with the standard. Some market-opening measures were
specified in the legislation as requirements for most incumbent local
exchange carriers, and the FCC adopted detailed performance standards
and implementation schedules for such requirements within a few months
166
or years after enactment of the legislation. The statute also allowed the
161. Congress sought “to provide for a pro-competitive, de-regulatory national policy
framework designed to accelerate rapidly private sector deployment of advanced
telecommunications and information technologies and services to all Americans by opening
all telecommunications markets to competition.” S. CONF. REP. NO. 104-230, at 1 (1996).
162. 47 U.S.C. § 253(a) (Supp. V 2000).
163. § 251.
164. See Implementation Schedule, supra note 111; Implementation of the Local
Competition Provisions in the Telecomms. Act of 1996, First Report and Order, 11
F.C.C.R. 15499, 4 Comm. Reg. (P & F) 1 (1996), aff’d in part and vacated in part sub nom.
Competitive Telecomms. Ass’n v. FCC, 117 F.3d 1068 (8th Cir. 1997), aff’d in part and
vacated in part sub nom. Iowa Utils. Bd. v. FCC, 120 F.3d 753 (8th Cir. 1997), aff’d in part,
rev’d in part and remanded sub nom. AT&T Corp. v. Iowa Utils. Bd., 525 U.S. 366 (1999);
Implementation of the Local Competition Provisions of the Telecomms. Act of 1996, Third
Report and Order and Fourth Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 15 F.C.C.R. 3696,
18 Comm. Reg. (P & F) 888 (1999) [hereinafter UNE Remand Order]; Deployment of
Wireline Services Offering Advanced Telecomms. Capability, Third Report and Order in
CC Docket Number 98-147, 14 F.C.C.R. 20912, 18 Comm. Reg. (P & F) 758 (1999);
Review of the Section 251 Unbundling Obligations of Incumbent Local Exchange Carriers,
Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 16 F.C.C.R. 22781 (2001); Verizon Comm. v. FCC, 122 S.
Ct. 1646 (2002); U.S. Telecom Ass’n v. FCC, 290 F.3d 415 (D.C. Cir. 2002); Rebecca
Beynon, The FCC’s Implementation of the 1996 Act: Agency Litigation Strategies and
Delay, 53 FED. COMM. L.J. 27 (2000); David M. Mandy, Progress and Regress on
InterLATA Competition, 52 FED. COMM. L.J. 321 (2000).
165. 47 U.S.C. § 271 (Supp. V 2000).
166. See generally Implementation Schedule, supra note 111. For example, the
legislation explicitly required local number portability, and the FCC adopted detailed rules
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FCC to identify other market-opening measures not specified in the law
(such as access to operational support systems to speed the processing of
167
interconnection requests). The FCC could order that such measures be
implemented generally, and also review such implementation in the context
of applications by Bell regional operating companies (the local exchange
carriers created by the divestitures of local exchange carriers from AT&T
168
in 1984) to obtain authority to provide long-distance services. For
for local number portability, including an implementation schedule. § 251(b)(2) requires all
local exchange carriers “to provide, to the extent technically feasible, number portability in
accordance with requirements prescribed by the Commission.” 47 U.S.C. § 251(b)(2) (Supp.
V 2000). The legislation defined number portability in 47 U.S.C. § 153(30), and addressed
how the cost would be recovered in order to prevent such cost from thwarting competition
in 47 U.S.C. § 251(e)(2). The FCC adopted a series of orders requiring local exchange
carriers to offer interim number portability “to the extent technically feasible” and to
implement gradually permanent number portability. Telephone Number Portability, First
Report and Order, 11 F.C.C.R. 8352, 3 Comm. Reg. (P & F) 600 (1996) (quoting §
251(b)(2)); Telephone Number Portability, Second Report and Order, 12 F.C.C.R. 12281, 8
Comm. Reg. (P & F) 1377 (1997); Telephone Number Portability, Third Report and Order,
13 F.C.C.R. 11701, 12 Comm. Reg. (P & F) 1377 (1998); Telephone Number Portability,
Fourth Memorandum Opinion and Order on Reconsideration, 14 F.C.C.R. 16459, 16
Comm. Reg. (P & F) 757 (1999). Compliance with the number portability regulations is also
specified in the legislation as an item on the checklist for Bell operating company entry into
long-distance services. 47 U.S.C. § 271(c)(2)(B)(xi) (Supp. V 2000).
167. 47 U.S.C. § 271(c)(2)(B)(ii) (Supp. V 2000). “Under checklist item 2, a BOC [Bell
Operating Company] must demonstrate that it provides non-discriminatory access to the five
operational support systems (OSS) functions: (1) pre-ordering; (2) ordering; (3)
provisioning; (4) maintenance and repair; and (5) billing.” Joint Application of SBC Comm.
Inc., Southwestern Bell Tel. Co., and Southwestern Bell Comm. Svcs., Inc., d/b/a/
Southwestern Bell Long Distance Pursuant to Sec. 271 of the Telecomm. Act of 1996 to
Provide In-Region, InterLATA Services in Ark. and Mo., Memorandum Opinion and Order,
16 F.C.C.R. 20719, 25 Comm. Reg. (P & F) 183 para. 15 (2001) [hereinafter SBC AK-MO
Order]. See also Application by Bell Atl. N.Y. for Authorization Under Sec. 271 of the
Comm. Act to Provide In-Region, InterLATA Service in the State of N.Y., Memorandum
Opinion and Order, 15 F.C.C.R. 3953, paras. 17-20, 19 Comm. Reg. (P & F) 1, 6-8 (1999)
[hereinafter Bell Atl. N.Y. Order], aff’d sub nom. AT&T Corp. v. FCC, 220 F.3d 607 (D.C.
Cir. 2000); Sprint Comm. Co. v. FCC, 274 F.3d 549 (D.C. Cir. 2001).
The FCC determined in 1999 that requesting carriers are impaired without
nondiscriminatory access to incumbent local exchange carriers’ OSS functions, and
mandated that these functions be made available as unbundled network elements under 47
U.S.C. § 251(c)(3). See UNE Remand Order, supra note 164, para. 433; Bell Atl. N.Y.
Order, supra, para. 84. The FCC, however, decided not to adopt quantitative and qualitative
performance measurement rules for this unbundled network element and instead to rely on
state commission review and its review of § 271 applications. UNE Remand Order, supra
note 164, at para. 437 (rejecting request of one competitive carrier to adopt performance
standards so that failure to satisfy these standards would “automatically trigger a process to
identify and correct the root cause of the OSS problem”). See also SBC AK-MO Order,
supra, para. 26.
168. The legislation specified a fourteen-point checklist which had to be satisfied for a
Bell company to be authorized to provide long-distance services in a state, a time limit for
FCC consideration of any application, and a procedure involving review by the applicable
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operational support systems, the FCC decided to interpret this standard and
judge a company’s compliance with it through case-by-case determinations
169
over time in response to applications for long-distance authority.
The Bell companies had sought a clear path to long-distance service
authority in the legislation. Congress viewed the incentive of this authority
as a very tempting carrot to get these companies to implement the measures
170
which the FCC would review in the context of such applications.
Although the legislation had not provided a schedule for implementing
some of these measures, many legislators, regulators, and carriers assumed
that this incentive was sufficiently strong that they could count on
widespread implementation within at most a few years.
The multiyear promise took the following form: if a Bell company
demonstrated that it had implemented all the market-opening measures in a
state, and the FCC determined that such standard was satisfied, then the
Bell company would be authorized to provide long-distance services to
users in that state. In the months and years following enactment of the
legislation, billions of dollars were spent based on these expectations.
Competitive carriers collected billions of dollars from investors, negotiated
interconnection agreements with the Bell companies, developed networks
and/or resale strategies, marketed services, and submitted interconnection
orders on the belief that this incentive would quickly drive the Bell
171
companies to implement measures to satisfy the standard. On the Bell
state commission and the U.S. Department of Justice. 47 U.S.C. § 271(c)(2)(B), (d)(2)(A)(B), (d)(3) (Supp. V 2000); SBC AK-MO Order, supra note 167, app. D, paras. 1-14.
169. Even after more than five and one-half years, and experience with many
applications, the FCC chose to continue with case-by-case determinations:
The determination of whether the statutory standard is met is ultimately a
judgment the Commission must make based on its expertise in promoting
competition in local markets and in telecommunications regulation generally. The
Commission has not established, nor does it believe it appropriate to establish,
specific objective criteria for what constitutes “substantially the same time and
manner” or a “meaningful opportunity to compete.” Whether this legal standard is
met can only be decided based on an analysis of specific facts and circumstances.
SBC AK-MO Order, supra note 165, para. 6 (citations omitted).
170. See, e.g., Statement by President William J. Clinton Upon Signing the
Telecommunications Act of 1996, P.L. 104-104, 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N., Vol. 4 at 228-2;
Additional Views of Rep. John D. Dingell et al., Telecommunications Act of 1996, P.L.
104-104, 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N., Vol. 4 at 100-03.
171. See Internet Hearing, supra note 8 (Prepared Statement of James H. Henry)
(“[Competitive local exchange] carriers deployed approximately $55 billion in capital to
build alternative local networks.”). For contrasting views of the market experience of
competitive local exchange carriers in the United States and related regulatory actions, see
ASS’N FOR LOCAL TELECOM. SVCS., PROGRESS REPORT ON THE CLEC INDUSTRY (Oct. 17,
2002), available at http://www.alts.org/Filings/101702CLECProgressReport.pdf; Larry
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companies’ side, some companies deployed facilities and implemented
systems which they believed would satisfy the standard for authorization to
provide long-distance services and devoted resources to preparing for
providing these services.
The lack of a clear commitment by the regulators and carriers to a
schedule and standards for some market-opening measures cost both the
competitive carriers and the Bell companies dearly. Some Bell companies
172
did not go after the carrot aggressively in some states. For these carriers,
the opportunity to provide long-distance service did not offset the costs of
implementing these measures and losing market share in local services.
This left the competitors in many states befuddled by local markets which
were less open than they expected. As the market results of new entrants
fell below expectations, investors lost interest in many competitive carriers.
Moreover, the criteria applied by regulators in determining whether a
Bell company successfully implemented some of these measures was not
173
clear in the legislation and remained unclear for many years. Court
decisions remanding FCC orders approving two applications added an
element to the regulatory analysis, the possibility of a price squeeze
174
contrary to the public interest, and further uncertainty to the process. No
application was found to satisfy the standard for more than three and one175
half years after enactment of the legislation, and as October 25, 2002
(over six and one-half years after enactment), approvals were granted for
only twenty-two states and thirteen applications covering twenty-one states
176
had been denied or withdrawn.
Darby et al., The CLEC Experiment: Anatomy of a Meltdown, 9.23 PROGRESS & FREEDOM
FOUND. PROGRESS ON POINT (Sept. 2002), available at http://www.pff.org/publications/
POP9.23CLEC.pdf.
172. For example, one Bell regional holding company, US WEST (now a subsidiary of
Qwest Communications Inc.), did not apply to the FCC for long-distance service authority
for any of the fourteen states where it provides local exchange services until June 13, 2002.
See Comments Requested on the Application by Quest Communications International, Inc.
for Authorization Under Section 271 of the Communications Act to Provide In-Region,
Interlata Service in the States of Colorado, Idaho, Iowa, Nebraska, and North Dakota, Public
Notice, 17 F.C.C.R. 11041 (2002).
173. See SBC AK-MO Order, supra note 167, app. D.
174. Sprint Comm. Co. v. FCC, 274 F.3d 549, 554-56 (D.C. Cir. 2001); WorldCom, Inc.
v. FCC, No. 01-1198 (D.C. Cir. Oct. 22, 2002), at http://www.fcc.gov/ogc/documents/
opinions/2002/01-1198.html.
175. Bell Atl. N.Y. Order, supra note 167.
176. RBOC Applications to Provide In-Region, InterLATA Services Under § 271, at
http://www.fcc.gov/Bureaus/Common_Carrier/in-region_applications/. Applications were
pending for thirteen states as of October 24, 2002. The FCC observed in 1999:
“Unfortunately, implementation of this congressional vision of increased
telecommunications competition has, in many instances, not proceeded swiftly or smoothly.
For example, some of the Section 271 applications that we have reviewed to date have fallen
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Even after some Bell companies had implemented these measures in
some states and gained FCC approval, the FCC did not establish a schedule
or uniform standards for the deployment of these capabilities in other
177
states and found that some applications for long-distance authority failed
178
to demonstrate adequate compliance. Uncertainty continues in these
states as to when the Bell companies would choose to implement the
market-opening measures and how the FCC and courts will review
particular applications; this uncertainty about the quality and prices of
interconnection services and the timing of Bell company entry into longdistance services creates costs for the competitive carriers and the Bell
companies.
The legislation created a multiyear promise relying on an incentive
approach to achieving market-opening changes which were important for
the policy goal of local competition. The carriers, however, did not promise
(nor were required) to implement the measures on a fixed schedule. Nor did
the legislation together with the FCC’s regulations give clarity to the
standards for judging implementation of those measures for at least several
years. This approach did not achieve rapid implementation of these changes
and caused costs from the uncertainties related to the timing and scope of
such measures.

far short of the statutory requirements.” Bell Atl. N.Y. Order, supra note 167, para. 4. See
also Application of Ameritech Mich. Pursuant to Sec. 271 of the Comms. Act of 1934, as
amended, to Provide In-Region, InterLATA Services in Mich., Memorandum Opinion and
Order, 12 F.C.C.R. 20543, 9 Comm. Reg. (P & F) 267 (1997); Application of BellSouth
Corp., et al. Pursuant to Section 271 of the Comms. Act of 1934, as amended, To Provide
In-Region, InterLATA Services in S.C., Memorandum Opinion and Order, 13 F.C.C.R.
539, 10 Comm. Reg. (P & F) 870 (1997); Application of BellSouth Corp., BellSouth
Telecomms., Inc. and BellSouth Long Distance, Inc., for Provision of In-Region,
InterLATA Services in La., Memorandum Opinion and Order, 13 F.C.C.R. 20599, 13
Comm. Reg. (P & F) 1082 (1998); SBC AK-MO Order, supra note 167; Statement, Michael
Powell, Chairman, FCC, Withdrawal of BellSouth 271 Application (Dec. 20, 2001), at
http://ftp.fcc.gov/Speeches/Powell/Statements/2001/stmkp146.html.
177. See Internet Hearing, supra note 8 (Prepared statement of Clark McLeod, Chairman
and Co-CEO, McLeodUSA Inc.) (“What I propose here is adding a ‘stick’ to our policy
scheme, in addition to the ‘carrot.’ . . . So the key is for Congress to amend [§] 271 to
require the Mega-Bells to meet those requirements to the satisfaction of the FCC by a date
certain.”).
178. RBOC Applications to Provide In-Region, InterLATA Services Under § 271,
http://www.fcc.gov/Bureaus/Common_Carrier/in-region_applications/ (listing, for the
period before the first approved application, five applications which were denied and one
application which was withdrawn in light of probable denial; for the period after the first
approved application until October 25, 2002, listing seven applications which were
withdrawn in light of probable denial). See Statement of FCC Chairman Michael Powell on
Withdrawal of Qwest’s Multi-State 271 Applications (Sept. 10, 2002), available at
http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs_public/attachmatch/DOC-226127A1.pdf.
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V. CONCLUSION
Under some conditions, regulators have boldly broken out of the
piecemeal, ad hoc approaches to regulations as short-term fixes to be
revised when and how the regulators subsequently decide. Multiyear
promises have been adopted in some instances to address complex
interrelated issues, and establish a predictable framework for investments,
operations, and technological development.
The industries and consumers affected by regulations make decisions
on investments and other actions which are inherently multiyear, forcing
them to make assumptions about future regulatory conditions, and to adopt
strategies with some losses in effective uses of productive resources.
Markets reflect regulatory uncertainties even if regulators do not weigh
these consequences. Regulatory uncertainties can harm consumers and be
contrary to the public interest. Regulators should more frequently recognize
the large efficiency enhancements of decreasing the uncertainty
surrounding future regulations and strive to adopt well-defined sequences
of regulatory changes with clear timing.
In some circumstances, addressing an issue with an interim marker is
as well as regulators can do. The delays from formulating a multiyear plan
would be costly, and the broad contingencies that would have to be
addressed may substantially diminish the benefits from a longer-term
framework. On the other hand, legislators, regulators, and courts should
weigh the opportunity costs to businesses and consumers of the
uncertainties surrounding future regulatory actions and seek to provide
more predictable future regulatory rules.
Specifically, there should be an increase in:
• Legislators (a) adopting statutes in which a well-defined sequence
of regulatory changes is timed based on clear, readily observed
market conditions, as opposed to commission findings regarding
the occurrence of broad, ambiguous criteria; (b) refraining from
adding to regulatory uncertainty by the frequent introduction of
bills to amend statutes, including legislation to reverse regulatory
decisions; and (c) encouraging regulators to adopt multiyear
commitments for regulatory stability or well-defined regulatory
changes.
• Regulators (a) adopting multiyear commitments for regulatory
stability or well-defined regulatory changes, with narrow criteria
for waivers or mid-term adjustments; (b) making comprehensive
decisions on interrelated regulatory changes; (c) refraining from
substantially modifying rules on reconsideration soon after
adoption or granting broad waivers; (d) adopting rules with well-
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defined criteria based on clear, readily observed market conditions
as opposed to case-by-case analysis of broad, complex factors;
and (e) encouraging industry and consumer groups to work out
multiyear agreements on regulatory stability or changes.
Judges giving weight to the benefits of regulatory certainty when
reviewing the record evidence or cost/benefit analysis supporting
a multiyear or comprehensive agency decision, or a denial of a
request for reconsideration or waiver.

